THE MASTERY OF THE PACIFIC

CAN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES AGREE?

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N the current newspaper press of the United States of America one may note some exuberant patriots making prognostications that the British Empire and the United States "must come to blows" on the question of the Pacific, and that "therefore" the United States should push on with a great naval programme. In Great Britain there is, though not to a like degree, a certain amount of concurrent discussion-rarely in the newspapers, more often in conversation-of that calamity as a possibility or probability. more than one foreign country there is quite hopeful talk of it as a desirable development; and a determination to do nothing at any rate which would lessen the chance of its coming.

There seems no possibility of ignoring all this discussion, even though to ignore it is the more comfortable course and to join in it has its dangers. But I venture to think that no harm

can follow, on either side of the Atlantic, a recognition of the fact that the problems of the Pacific are pressing more and more each year for a solution, and a frank statement of the facts which compel the British Empire and the United States to be chiefly responsible for seeking such a solution as would give content to all those in the world who aspire to peace. This can be done, I trust, without suspicion of "warmongering."

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Nowadays old-fashioned diplomacy, like other old-fashioned things, is somewhat suspect; but that diplomacy had at least the merit of a seemly reticence. Was it not Metternich, a greatly abused diplomat of the old fashion, who, at an International Conference when the word "war" was used, held up his hands in decent horror and exclaimed, "Hush! War is an obscene word; never to be used, lest using it one makes the idea of it more possible"?

War is an obscene word; especially to those of us who, as civilians or soldiers, have had direct knowledge of the horrors of 1914–1918; have seen, as I have seen, the shreds of a pregnant mother cast into the streets by a bomb

from a Zeppelin; children in France going to their cellar schools behind the line wearing gasmasks; splendid youngsters drowned in the foul filth of a battlefield; not to mention the more correct and usual incidents of wholesale slaughter.

* *

War is an obscene word; more especially to those who give any logical thought to the character of the next Great War, if such a calamity should come. Whenever there recurs in this country, or in other countries, an alarm about Air Force, the fact that in the next Great War between Powers which boast themselves civilized the use of Air Force will be intensified is stressed. The argument is enforced with dreadfully truthful forecasts of the rôle in the future of the bombing aeroplane. It will be able to carry bombs weighing a ton. will be filled, sometimes with high explosives, sometimes with deadly gases which will creep along the ground for hundreds of yards from the point of discharge, killing everything they meet. London might be destroyed as a habitable city within an hour of the Declaration of War by the operations of a great fleet of bombing

planes. So the argument proceeds. The end of it always is an urging to prepare: to get ready thousands of bombing aeroplanes, great stores of enormous bombs, of cylinders holding a gas which will be at once poisonous, heavy in specific gravity and capable of being safely transported in highly condensed form.

The dismal argument marches stage by stage to the conclusion that in the next Great War armies will count for less, navies for less, and the most effective killer will be the bombing aeroplane. There the march usually stops. But I suggest to follow it to its logical conclusion. That conclusion, if we are still to discuss the future of the world in terms of warfare, should be that the statesmen of any nation who have a reasonable forethought for their nation's survival should insist at once on the stoppage of all above-ground building; the dispersal of all art collections; the cessation of any care for gardens, parks, or aught else on the surface of the earth, since all such things are evidently doomed to a transient existence. They should concentrate the resources of their nation on these three things:

(1) The provision of subterranean accommodation for all the population of the country.

- (2) Scientific research to seek out some form of fungus vegetation, capable of supporting life, which could be cultivated underground, and also to realize, if possible, Mr. H. G. Wells's idea of the Moon oxen.
- (3) The provision of the utmost possible number of bombing aeroplanes and the perfection of high explosives and poison gases.

Can anyone deny that that is the true logic of the position if we recognize alike the defensive and the offensive aspects of a future Great War? Are there any great numbers of men to whom it would be a source of comfort to know that, whilst they and those who were dear to them were gasping out their lives in a poison gas cloud in one street, the same horror was being inflicted by their Air Forces on the population of some other city? I think not. If there is to be a Great War in the future, we must prepare to go back to the troglodyte life and scrap now all of our civilization which depends on our joy in the sun, in the air which we know as the air of heaven, in the forests, fields, gardens and the shores of the sea.

In that future Great War the chief dignitaries of a warring nation will be the poisoners-inchief and the aerial transport commanders.

Cities will disappear in a day. The remnants of populations will burrow underground, coming to the surface only to discharge their lethal air fleets against their enemies (and perhaps, in the earlier stages of a campaign, to snatch from the surface of the earth some scanty provision of food). Arts, commerce, will wither away as the clouds of poison gas roll over country after country.

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War is an obscene word; most especially when it is used in relation to the affairs of two nations professing the same humane ideals, speaking the same language, having pride of common partnership in most of modern civilization's great achievements for freedom and progress, using day by day the same prayer invoking the Kingdom of God to come on earth and beseeching the Almighty to "lead us not into temptation."

* *

Truly, war is an obscene word. But was Metternich right that it is never to be used because familiarity with the word may create familiarity with the idea? Or are the reckless

talkers and writers who refer to it as a possibility perhaps doing something to make war impossible by discussing the idea of it in what would be its most wicked, most stupid and most disastrous form?

None can say with certainty. In this book I shall try to avoid any phrase which would suggest that war between the British Empire and the United States over a Pacific Ocean issue is anything but "unthinkable." I shall, however, discuss with openness the circumstances which may cause friction between the two English-speaking Powers, and shall not attempt to advance any pretences that there is something uniquely high-minded and noble in either British or American public policy which could be safely relied on to induce an unselfish and disinterested attitude of self-abnegation on either side at a crisis. Many people in Great Britain, many people in the United States, may honestly believe that that is the position: that if a definite, irreconcilable clash of national interests came, one party, rather than face the tragic consequences, would meekly accept the part of submission. They are wrong: or else all the lessons of history, all the conclusions of experience of human nature, are wrong.

It would be folly to base the discussion on a plane of hypocrisy: to attempt to bury our heads in the sand—as the ostrich does not do—and pretend that things which are not seen therefore do not exist. What is necessary is a realistic, logical appreciation of the facts, an appreciation stripped of all fallacious sentiment; and from that appreciation to recognize that enlightened self-interest should dictate both to the British Empire and to the United States the need of friendly co-operation in the Pacific. A policy of enlightened self-interest is the most that can be hoped for from any group of men.

* *

In a general discharge of minds from false ideas and from hypocrisy on the subject of Anglo-American relations, the British people will have some work to do.

They will need, in the first place, to clear their thoughts of the dangerous fallacy that the people of the United States are a British people, a branch of the British race which at an earlier stage of history, following on a war, took up a position which other branches of that race, in Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, have taken up, in effect, since without

any quarrel. The United States people are not British; the British stock in the race amalgam, which is the greatest white people of the world, is not even predominant in numbers. All calculations based on the idea that the United States people must act as a British people are therefore wrong.

In the second place, they will need to learn to regard the United States people as having to-day very similar problems to those which confronted the British Empire in its formative stage; and will need to come to a clearer conception of the ideas and methods of the British Empire in its stage of growth—rather than in its present stage, at which it has outgrown the prompting that sends a boy raiding the cupboard, not because he wishes to steal jam but to make sure that no wicked mice are spoiling the jam.

In the third place, they will have to accept it as an unfortunate fact that foreign observer—and the United States is one foreign observer—are apt to judge British policy more on its past than on its present, or future, good intentions: to find reasons to suspect some guileful greed in what we think to be fair and unselfish proposals.

In the past the British Empire did not insist on the privilege of a rowdy nation to grow weeds in its fields to spoil the good British garden next door; or even to grind a hurdy-gurdy to our disturbance when we were trying to think out plans for the better development of the human race. With, I honestly believe, as little cruelty as possible and with a minimum of needless interference, but quite resolutely, the British race went on its way, tidying up shabby corners of the universe and putting order and progress where there had been anarchy and stagnation. We followed that course always with the best intentions, no doubt, but, in following it, often constituted ourselves Judgewithout-appeal in causes to which we were an interested party. It is on the record of the expansion era that we are judged to-day, not on our intentions in the present era when we have "found grace" after having "found"—in the sense that the soldier in the field uses the word—about one-fourth of the earth's surface. Accordingly, we cannot afford to be censorious when we see another nation following in spirit, and sometimes in method, our own old policy of tidying up what it regards as shabby corners inter-

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fering with the amenities of its section of the world.

* *

The task for many British minds in getting rid of false ideas and hypocrisies will be of some difficulty. But it will be easy compared with the task which faces perhaps the majority of the citizens of the United States, who seem to regard their country as a Quaker in foreign affairs. The conception of the United States as pursuing, in happy contrast to wicked Europe, a simple and unselfish national life, with no desire for expansion, no thought of interfering with the affairs of others, in the world but not of the world, is nonsense. The map proclaims it. In the middle of the eighteenth century the United States began national housekeeping with a small territory on the seaboard of the Atlantic. In the nineteenth century that area was extended, by purchase, by conquest, by plain taking, to an area almost as large as Europe. The twentieth century sees the United States established at great strategic points in Central America, in the Caribbean Sea, in the North Pacific, and along the coast of Asia, determined evidently to

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obtain control of all North America south of Canada, insisting that any American affair is solely her affair and that in the rest of the world she is to have an equal voice with other Powers.

The truth is that the United States is the great "Imperialist" Power of the world to-day. It would be abnormal if it were otherwise. Nations, like individuals, are governed by biological laws. A disposition to make anxious sacrifices to the gods who grant peace is the sign of old age. A young, strong nation is as naturally aggressive and ambitious as a young, strong boy, and—since the United States has grown up very quickly, and chiefly from uprooted sections of other peoples, who lost most of their old tradition on being transplanted and have not yet had time to mature a restraining tradition of their own—this particular youth is naturally forthright.

Turn to the map and to historical facts for proof. In 1845 Mr. President Polk extended Mr. President Monroe's doctrine of 1823 to mean that it was the duty of the United States "to annex American territory lest it be annexed by European countries"; so Texas, Oregon and California were annexed. In 1867 a United States protest was entered against the Federa-

tion of the Canadian Provinces. In 1870 Mr. President Grant forecasted "the end of European political connection with this continent." In 1895 the United States view was that "foreign colonies ought to cease in this hemisphere."

Only when the United States expansionist ideal which would, in effect, make her the suzerain of all North, Central and South America has met a direct "no" from Great Britain, has it ever been modified or its operation postponed. Every weaker objection has been brushed aside. The Hawaiian Kingdom was blessed in the first instance with a benevolent American suzerainty; then with "free institutions" when the Hawaiian Republic was established. The next step was annexation, and to-day the Hawaiian has as much "selfdetermination" as the native of Central Africa. The manner in which Spain administered her colonial possessions seemed to the United States to be capable of improvement; and a war with Spain gave Cuba and the Philippines to her control. The little sister Republic of Colombia, knowing that the United States had need of the area which the Panama Canal would cross. was inclined to drive a hard bargain over the

concession. Her desire to exploit the opportunity was vetoed with the promotion of the independent Republic of Panama by the United States, which seceded from Colombia and used its new liberty at once to make arrangements which were satisfactory to Washington.

To-day the little sister Republic of Nicaragua is in much the same position as was the Republic of Colombia in 1903. There is another canal area in Nicaragua; and this is intended to come under the control of the United States. If Mexico thinks fit to interfere she will be taught her place. Mexico has already lost to the United States more than half of the area which she controlled when in 1813 she first declared her independence of Spain: the remainder would go the same way.

Those are essential facts of United States foreign policy, put in terms of plain English and not in the phraseology which calls invasion of a friendly country "establishing a neutral zone." That foreign policy is not guided by the maxims which Mr. President Wilson set forth so didactically about the rights of small nations and the sacred principle of self-determination; does not take the view that, on the continent of America, there should be independence for a

feeble community to the extent of mismanaging its own affairs. It is guided by what was the old governing principle of British Imperialism, that there is no sacred right of a backward people to hold up the development of civilization.

In short, the United States people have to drop the humbug of pretending to be Quakers and come to the discussion of foreign affairs with a realist appreciation of the fact that they are by destiny the Imperialists of the twentieth century, as were the British of previous centuries: that most of the future big aggressions on "self-determination" and "the rights of small nations" are going to be their aggressions, undertaken, without doubt, under the compulsion of circumstances, but still undertaken. With that appreciation they will come to a more reasonable attitude in negotiations with their neighbours; will come to recognize that, in order to carry out peaceably the tasks which will fall inevitably to their hand, they will need reasonableness as well as power; will cease to think in terms of the one just man in a wicked world; and will be content to widen their territories without widening their phylacteries.

As far back as 1912, in a study of the Problems.

of the Pacific (which the British Foreign Office thought worthy of serious notice), after analysing the factors, I ventured the conclusion—the truth of which has survived all the worldshattering events since—that:

Great Britain is the sole European Power capable of independent effort in the Pacific. Clearly the rivalry for the dominance of the ocean lies between her and the United States. To discuss that rivalry is to discuss the real Problem of the Pacific. It may be done frankly, I trust, without raising suggestions of unfriendliness. A frank discussion of the problem, carried out on both sides of the Atlantic. would be of the greatest value to civilization. For the position seems to be that both Powers are preparing to capture the Pacific; that neither Power can hold it against the other: and that a peaceful settlement can only be founded on complete mutual understanding.

There is no need to presume hostile rivalry. On the other hand, there is no wisdom in following blindly a policy of drift which may lead to that rivalry. The question of the future of the Pacific narrows down to this: Will two great Powers take advantage of a common tongue to talk out frankly, honestly, their aims and purpose so that they may arrive at a

To-day the position is in essentials unchanged. Now, as then, the development of policy brings the British and the American Powers nearer each year to the question of the hegemony of the Pacific. Now, as then, there is no good reason on either side, and no disinclination on the British side, why both should not seek a solution in the spirit of friendly co-operation. Some great changes have come since 1912, especially in regard to Russia, whose influence was then, on the whole, for world peace, but is now actively for destruction. But none of these changes have lessened, all of them rather have added to, the importance of Anglo-American understanding. The world question of the near future is whether the British Empire and the North American Republic will endanger civilization by quarrelling over the Pacific; or whether they will come to a friendly understanding to guard it as the Peace Ocean, not to be exploited for British interests, nor American interests, nor for a combination of British and American interests. but to be safe kept as a trust for humanity.

To put that world question plainly it will be necessary to discuss in the following pages some matters which may seem at first extraneous to.

the Pacific issue—for examples, the trend of the diplomatic and financial policy of the United States during and since the World War, and the circumstances which led up to the ruin of Russia as a Power. But it will be seen that they are essential to an argument which is in brief this: that the Pacific Ocean will bring up the next great world problems; that their happy and peaceful solution is easily possible with Anglo-American co-operation; not easily imaginable otherwise, since the United States, though vast in power, is not powerful enough to be dictator.

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
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THE MASTERY OF THE PACIFIC

CHAPTER I

EUROPE HAS NO SAY

Effect of World War on Europe—Great Britain not a merely European Power—The European groups before 1914—Lessening of European influence in world politics—The share of the United States in effecting this.

HE future of the Pacific is for settlement between the British Empire and the United States, with possibly Japan intervening. Neither any individual European nation singly, nor Europe collectively, can affect the determination; and Japan could do so only in case of an irreducible antagonism between the British and the American peoples.

Before 1914 that could not be stated with certainty, for Germany and France had outposts, and Russia (then, but not now, a partner in the European system) was strongly established

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there and was still a possible great factor in spite of failure in her war with Japan. The World War drove Germany out of the Pacific altogether, changed the position of France so considerably that she no longer has aspirations there, and reduced Russia to the status of a gigantic Alsatia, an Ishmael among nations, with some potentialities for mischief—as will be shown later when the position of Asia is dealt with—but with no voice in world councils.



In any consideration of Europe's part in international affairs, Great Britain cannot rightly be regarded as merely a European Power. She has not been that, in the sense of a full partner in any European combination, since the days of Queen Elizabeth, that time in the British Islands' story when the people emerged as a truly united nation—their blood mingled of that of the Britons, the Romans, the Danes, the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans—a nation inspired by a general vigour of thought and action which showed in every aspect of their life and especially in their rich, noble language, the language of the James Translation of the Bible, of the Book of Common

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Prayer and of Shakespeare. The British people found their thoughts at that time turned away from old vain ambitions of conquests in Europe and set themselves to building up an Overseas Empire. It was a definite turning point in British history and the way chosen then has been faithfully followed since, with only slight and temporary vacillations.

So definite was the departure of the British race from out the European system, in the sense of seeking a destiny within that system, that Great Britain has often had to meet the reproach of being "a bad European," because, though her aims were not European, her close neighbourhood to the European continent forced on her an interest in European affairs, which found its general expression in a suspicion of any Power striving to become paramount there. This suspicion was instinctive, perhaps, rather than the result of conscious policy. But its working can be traced very clearly in British-European relations since Elizabeth; in the struggle with Spain; the subsequent struggles with France; in the refusal to join with a European Holy League to check the growth of independent States on the American continent (Canning certainly saw the position clearly.

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when he "called in the New World to redress the balance of the old": it may be noted that Great Britain, if "a bad European" at this point, was "a good American").

Subsequent international history shows always the same principle at work in the British mind. The idea of the "Balance of Power," which was the guiding motive of British foreign policy and the reason for joining in the wars against Napoleon, and later against Russia, was rooted in the wish to safeguard the British Empire against the possibility of a United Europe, or an undisputedly paramount European Power, challenging her position.

The fear of this was not unreasonable. As late as the time of the South African war there was a definite attempt to organize a combination of the European Powers to interfere in the issue, an attempt which was seen to be vain after consideration of the overwhelming naval strength which Great Britain could bring against any coalition.

With the rise of the German Powers in the latter part of the nineteenth century, British policy found itself confronted with a special anxiety; for the Prussian mind brought as a new factor into the issue the questions of

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overseas territories and conceived the idea of obtaining a European union hostile to the British Empire, based on the calculation that there would be enough spoils in the British colonies to satisfy everybody and therefore no reason why France and Russia should not cooperate with Germany in a common enterprise. This idea seemed at one stage to be so close to realization that Great Britain, apparently without hope of reliable allies in Europe, went outside the European orbit and made a safeguarding arrangement with Japan. arrangement was chiefly designed to secure the British position in the Pacific Ocean and, without a doubt, would not have been made if there had been any possibility, as an alternative, of a clear understanding with the United States. If it had been possible in Canning's words "to call in the New World Power," there would have been no reason to turn to the Newest World Power, i.e. Japan, to redress the balance.

The effect of this Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was made necessary by the prospect of a European Alliance against Great Britain, was to bring against the British Empire the accusation of being, not only "a bad European,"

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but "a bad American." Yet it was a step forced by events and especially by the disinclination of the United States to co-operate in safeguarding the Pacific. Its result was immediate in removing a dangerous threat. The British Empire was again safe in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific; and, as the reward of that safety, found the European situation becoming at once easier. Again it was clear that a European combination of Powers could not challenge Great Britain successfully: the ruling motive for such a combination therefore disappeared. There was no usefulness in taking the risks of joining with Germany for the sake of a share in the lion's pelt when it was clear that the lion was not going to be skinned. First France, then Russia, became friendly to Great Britain.



The position in 1914 was therefore this: the strength of Europe was divided into two groups, the German and the Franco-Russian, and either of those groups could find some good reason to claim that it was of the first importance in world affairs, could hope to establish itself as the leader in the future

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development of civilization; outside Europe, the British Empire, the United States and Japan were the three chief forces. (The World War, in which the German group was ultimately faced by all four other forces, and withstood them successfully for a long period, conveys a comforting hint to mankind that in organizing for perfection in war a nation seems inevitably to lose common sense in other regards and is apt to lose in diplomacy the results of its fighting efficiency.)

The position in 1927 is that Europe has fallen back in her influence on world affairs in consequence of the World War to an extent which is hardly yet fully appreciated. In 1914 if there had been summoned a Grand Council to decide arbitrarily, on the basis of actual power, a world issue, it would have been of five, and Europe would have had two places. the British Empire and the United States each a place, with Japan, somewhat doubtfully, granted the fifth. In 1927 such a Grand Council would, perhaps, need to call only two representatives, the British Empire and the United Japan would be a doubtful third; Europe might claim a more doubtful fourth only if France, Italy and Germany could agree

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on the choice of that fourth. This is written, of course, in terms of a realist, a Machiavellian, estimate of actual power—not in the terms of the idealism of the League of Nations, which gives to Cuba a place in its council.

To analyse Europe's position in more detail: Russia has gone out of the European system and also has disappeared as a Power for a generation at least, probably for two generations, and survives only in world politics as a gigantic Soho or Bowery cellar of conspirators (she must be considered apart from Europe in a future chapter); the Austro-Hungarian Empire has disappeared as a Power and its territories divided among its neighbours and among new States, none of which can hope to become factors in world politics; Germany, diminished in territory and disarmed, will not shake the globe again for some time, though the genius of her people for work and for organization will restore her one day to a great position; France, the greatest military Power left in the world, seems still to cherish hopes of a return to her position of the days of Louis XIV or of Napoleon I, and to be reluctant to abandon them: but very soon, with that clear logic of hers, will recognize that it is

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"vanity and vexation of spirit" to dream of a martial glory based on the organization of negro levies and will see that her true destiny is to "dig in her garden," and continue to give to civilization a leadership, which no other nation can offer, in the art of sane living. The future status of Italy, enjoying a new Renaissance under the miraculous leadership of Mussolini, is not easily predictable at the moment, but for the purposes of this argument Italy may be classed with France and Germany.

The smaller peoples of Europe have no ambitions in world affairs. The Scandinavian States (with Finland properly to be included in their number) take rank with Holland, with Spain, with Belgium, with Switzerland, as content to keep their independence, to go about their national work quietly, and to exercise their influence to prevent any aggressive Power obtaining a paramount position in Europe. Whether such is their inclination or not, whether they esteem or dislike Great Britain, their foreign policy must work generally on British lines, for they wish to have no great master to be feared on the European continent.

It is not unreasonable therefore to state

that in the future great issues of world politics, which will arise on the margins of the Pacific Ocean, the influence of any single nation of Europe will be negligible. Granted that more than one of these nations might throw a useful weight in the balance, supposing a controversy between the British Empire, the United States and Japan, it is difficult to see how any one could be free to throw that weight. The only three that need to be considered are France. Italy and Germany. Supposing, for the sake of argument, one of these three wished to take up an attitude of intervention, the wish could hardly be translated into action because of fear of the other two. It would be obviously useless, say, for France to embark on an adventure without at least the benevolent neutrality of both Italy and Germany. The same caution is imposed equally on those two countries. Europe, apart from the cancer area of Russia and some minor ulcerated patches, is thus happily doomed to a policy of peace as regards its chief Powers. National exasperations and envies exist, but there is no present prospect of them leading to a great war.

A United Europe, even though Europe as a strategic force has been so much reduced by

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the cutting out of Russia, might have some powerful voice in a Pacific issue. But a united Europe is impossible if the enemy aimed at were to be Great Britain, since France, Italy and Germany would have no basis of combination against her. It is equally impossible if the enemy aimed at were the United States. except with Great Britain as a partner, ensuring the other Powers against their mutual distrusts: and that partnership is out of the question. After the World War there were vague suggestions that the victorious allies should unite to give to the United States a polite intimation. that all the debts due to her would naturally be annulled. The proposal, of course, never got to the stage of any documentary indiscretions, but I heard it more than once mentioned what the foreign correspondents "authoritative quarters." Great Britain would give no countenance to it and had to meet once again the grumble that she was "a bad European" and that her real policy was to put Europe under "Anglo-Saxon financial dominance"; and this grumble was not abandoned when, later, Great Britain suggested a general policy of cancellation of all war debts. between the Allies. If it be presumed—and

the presumption is reasonable—that Great Britain will never be a partner in a European Alliance to face the United States, then Europe collectively would have no power to intervene in a Pacific issue.

* *

Looking back on the months which followed the Armistice of 1918 and the various peace negotiations, which cut up Europe so thoroughly as to bedevil all hope of her quick economic recovery and to wreck any near prospect of the revival of a "European system" in world politics, it is interesting to note how significant was the influence of the United States in almost every development of importance. Nothing would be more fantastic than to credit Mr. President Wilson, acting then for the United States, with a deliberate plan to simplify world issues by reducing the factors which would really matter in the future to two, or at the utmost three, with his country as the predominant factor. But, in the result, that was the result of his efforts. He, wittingly or unwittingly, supported France in the policy of "Balkanizing" Europe so far as possible, the French idea being that the logical outcome

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of the war was French mastery of the Continent: and this policy had the inevitable result of breaking up to a great extent the great inter-European industrial organizations and setting up a maze of tariff barriers. But on the other hand, Mr. Wilson was willing to assist any check on the French realizing the fruits of this policy. Finally, his direct intervention in Italian affairs did more than anything else to arouse in Italy that spirit of outraged national pride which made the Mussolini revolution possible there, and so created another great check on a French hegemony of the Continent.

If the United States had shaken the dust of Europe off its shoes at an earlier stage after the war and had left the Continent to resettle its own affairs at a Peace Conference, there would have been much less talk of "self-determination" and fewer Secession States. (It is one of the ironies of history that the nation which fought a great Civil War to deny the right of secession affirmed that as an almost sacred principle for Europe in 1919!) There would, perhaps, have been no League of Nations. Certainly there would have been the utmost exploitation which circumstances allowed of the vanquished. But on the whole

there would have emerged, in all probability, a Europe better able to get back to its old position in the world. The clash between the old instructed realism and the new uninstructed idealism produced a compromise arrangement which was neither good morals nor good business. It must be said in justice that subsequent American intervention, not as a partner but as a disinterested amicus curiæ, producing the Dawes plan, made things somewhat better, but this betterment remedied no evils, only devised a method by which some evils were made endurable for the time being.

To suggest that Mr. Wilson, on behalf of the United States, aimed to put Europe as far as possible off the world map would be to wrong the memory of a man whose strong point was a high moral purpose. But to state that such was the general effect of his intervention, combined with the ruthless "woe to the vanquished" attitude of "Tiger" Clemenceau representing France, is to state the truth.

Then having assisted to make a thorough mess of the job of settling the foundations of a post-war Europe, the United States walked off the site: "downed tools" decisively, even

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in regard to the building up of her own special contribution to the plan, the League of Nations.

So Europe as a continent has no say in the question of the Pacific.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIA IN RUIN

Russia the chief casualty of the World War—How the Bolshevik Revolution came—Russia's early work for civilization—The religious motive in former Russian policy—The check from Japan—The Russian Reform movement—Primitive Christian influences in Russia—Russia to-day has no place in the world.

USSIA, formerly to be regarded not merely as a European but a European-Asiatic power, would have had to be considered as having some weight in the settlement of Pacific questions if she had not been wrecked by the World War. Despite the defeat she suffered at the hands of Japan, because of a too hasty attempt to establish a suzerainty over the Asiatic littoral of the Pacific Ocean, she would in the natural order of events have restored in time her naval and commercial strength there. Now, for the time being, there is no Russia to be considered.

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That Russia would be the one great casualty

of the World War no one could have predicted in 1914. To the minds of many students of world affairs, she was the coming European Power, a young nation with great reserves of vitality—this showing in her vices as well as her virtues—going through a stage somewhat analogous to that of Elizabethan England; much more likely, because of her more primitive, patriarchal social system, to endure a great shock than more highly organized nations.

There are some who profess to believe that Russia is not, after all, very seriously crippled: that she is merely throwing off in a revolutionary fever the accumulated grievances of past misgovernment, and that she will soon emerge stronger and healthier than before, as did France, after her Revolution, or, more recently, Italy after the Fascist Revolution. One is impelled to reject that belief for two reasons: the first, that in so far as facts can be gleaned from behind the frontiers of Russia, which are closed to all independent investigation, the Bolshevik oligarchy there has not shown vet any signs of producing a leader with constructive ability; the second, that the Revolution in Russia was not a Russian popular movement but a successful war manœuvre on

the part of Germany to cripple an enemy's fighting strength by injecting into her system a gang of international anarchists, few of whom were even of Russian blood. These anarchists, with the help of German organization, German arms and German money, were able to seize power, to exterminate those who might have become the leaders of a progressive Russia, and to govern, as Pizarro governed the Peruvians, by mere terrorism.

The Bolshevik tyranny has itself no roots in the Russian people, but has effectively destroyed the roots of a promising national movement. Not the atrocity of its methods is put forward as the reason why it cannot be a possible regenerative force, but the fact that it was not a natural growth of the Russian people, rather something imposed from outside for a definite destructive purpose and accomplishing that purpose for the pay of a foreign enemy.

In my view Russia may be left out of the reckoning in Pacific affairs (or any other international affairs calling for co-operation in constructive policy) for half a century. But ultimately, without much doubt, she will take a place in the world again—the Slavs are a

virile race and their land is rich in natural resources. Meanwhile her past work in opening up the Pacific, and her present influence for mischief in its affairs, have to be considered if only to emphasize the increased responsibility her collapse has imposed upon the peoples who wish to conserve the present social order.

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Geographical conditions kept Russia laggard in the path of Civilization in the days of the rise of the Mediterranean peoples. land of high steppes, great plains, vast forests, very cold in winter, very hot in summer, difficult to traverse except where the rivers had cut highways, Russia was never so tempting to the early European civilizations as to lead to her area being definitely occupied and held as a province. Neither Greek nor Roman attempted much colonization there. By general consent the country was left to be a no-man'sland between Asia and Europe. Alexander. even, whose armies penetrated to India (where they seem to have heard of the existence of the Australian continent), never carried his curiosity far into the interior of Russia. That great, gloomy country was not one of the worlds he sighed to conquer.

Western and Southern Europe in the course of centuries made but little impression on the Russian area. Byzantine culture just touched the Southern Slavs: a trace of Roman culture. after filtering through Germany, reached the Lithuanians of the north: Arabian caravans found their way as far as the Baltic in search of amber. With the advent of Norman adventurers in the ninth century Russia began to take shape as a nation. They consolidated White Bussia, ' from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, appeared as warriors before the walls of Byzantium, learned the Christian faith from the priests of the Eastern communion, produced national heroes, such as Rurik, Simeon and Truvor, and definitely set the current of Russian national thought towards a place in the European family of nations. By the thirteenth century the White Russians, with their capital at Moscow, were able to withstand for a while a new Mongol invasion westward. But they could not prevent Gengis Khan's lieutenants establishing themselves on the lower Volga, and the Grand Prince of Moscow had to become a suzerain of the Grand Khan of Tartary.

For three centuries thereafter Russia was

more or less subject to the Asiatic. But she was not Asiatic, and her vast area, standing as a barrier between Europe and Asia, allowed the more Western nations to grow up free from further interference by Eastern peoples, except in the case of the great invasion of the Turks coming up from the south-east. Great was the service that Russia did to European civilization during those centuries! If the Tartar had come with the Turk, the White Races and their civilization might have been swept away.

By the sixteenth century the Russian power had been consolidated under the Muscovite Czars, and a nation of which the governing class was European, the rank and file partly Asiatic, began to extend. The natural direction of its expansion was southward. The Russian nation aspired to a place in the sun, looked longingly towards the Mediterranean. Only the Turk apparently stood in the path, and for the Russian Czars war with the Turk had a religious motive: it was the Cross against the Crescent, the champion of the Eastern Church winning back the seat of the Byzantine Empire to Christian domination.

Not unimportant, this "religious motive"

in consideration of Russian policy—as Napoleon found, and as perhaps the present-day Bolsheviks may yet find. The Russians, in the mass, are Christians with the blind faith of the Primitive Church (the "Fundamentalists" of the United States would find them worthy brothers). But how much there was of religious impulse, and how much of mere materialistic national ambition in Russia's aim southward, did not concern other European Powers. Whatever its motive, they considered the development dangerous, since it threatened to give the Russian, with Constantinople, predominating power in Europe. It has been for centuries a maxim of all European chancelleries that no one of their rivals should have Constantinople. In particular, Great Britain was alarmed at the Russian aim towards that city. In the days of Elizabeth Great Britain had been a very good friend to Russia. But Russia was then no possible rival on land or on the high seas. In the days of Victoria Russia, with the laurels still green of her victories over Napoleon, was credited with being the greatest military Power in the world.

The Crimean War, waged by Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey in alliance, with its

resulting humiliating restrictions on Russian power in the Black Sea, showed Russia that Europe was determined to block her path south. She then turned east and marched steadily towards the Pacific (with a side glance at the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, which caused Great Britain fresh apprehension as to the Empire of India).

The progress of the Russian Power in Asia ' throughout the nineteenth century, and its sudden check at the dawn of the twentieth century, make a dramatic chapter of world history. European rivalry followed Russia on her march across Siberia, and the British Empire in particular was alarmed to see the "Colossus of the North" with a naval base in the Pacific. Alarm was deepened when, after reaching the waters of the Pacific. Russia turned south, again eager for a warm-water port. At that time, as to-day, China seemed to be on the verge of dissolution, and Russia looked like winning an Asiatic Empire beside which even India would appear small. 1885 Great Britain almost went to war with Russia in the defence of the integrity of Corea.

But the check to Russia came from another source. Asia reasserted her old warlike might.

The island power of Japan shook off the cumbrous armour of mediævalism—chiefly at the rude instigation of the United States, by the way—started on the path of modern progress and aspired to a place among the great nations of the earth. Russia was the immediate enemy and Japan prepared for war on her with uncanny determinedness and scrupulous attention to every detail. Vast military and naval armaments had to be prepared. The necessary money had to be wrung from a bitterly poor population or borrowed at usurious rates. political art with which that was done was not the least wonderful part of a great national achievement. Then, the weapons of war forged, it seemed good to Japanese statesmanship to flesh them on an easy victim. It was China's lot to teach the Japanese confidence in their new warlike arts, and to pay in the shape of an indemnity something towards the cost of the real struggle.

Had Czarist Russia had that relentless and clever diplomacy with which she used to be credited, she would never have permitted the Japanese attack upon China. Constituting herself the champion of China, she would at one stroke have pushed back the growing

power of Japan and established a claim to some suzerainty over the Celestial Empire. In carrying out her plans Japan had to take this chance, of Russia coming on top of her when she attacked China. She took the chance and won. Russia would have had to take the chance of a great European upheaval if she had interfered in the Japanese-Chinese affair. She did not take the chance, and allowed her rival to arm at China's expense to meet her.

The Chinese war finished, Japan, equipped with a full war-chest, a tried army and navy. was ready to meet Russia. But she was faced by the difficulty that in attacking Russia she might have to face a veto from another European Power or from the United States. Good fortune gave her the opportunity of a safeguarding alliance. It had become obvious -as mentioned in a previous chapter-at that time to British statesmanship that her "splendid isolation" was becoming dangerous in view of the growing menace of the German Powers and their policy of raising up antagonisms to her on questions of colonial policy. No reliable European friendships were offering: the United States were not inclined to enter into any definite understanding. Japan thus found.

Great Britain in a somewhat anxious mood, and an alliance was formed which gave to the British Empire security in the Pacific, but gave to Japan the more immediate advantage of the ring being held for her challenge to Russia.

In that war with Russia the Japanese conducted a fine campaign. Their generals and admirals followed the best models in their dispositions. Both in the movements and in the sanitary regulation of the troops, the commanders were much helped by the habit of discipline of a nation inured to yield blind obedience to a god-born ruler. But they won by the inferiority of the enemy more than by a genius for modern warfare.

The Russians on their side fought under the dispiriting conditions of having a welltrained enemy in front and a divided nation behind. The Russian autocracy was hampered at every turn by the internal disunion of a people in the first stage of turning from despotic to popular government. The autocracy hoped to solve in part a double problem by the mischievous ingenuity of drafting as many as possible of the discontented at home to the war abroad. That helped things in Russia,

but added to the difficulties of the Russian generals in Manchuria. Withal, the Russians put up a good fight. The early engagements were but rearguard actions, the Japanese having an enormous superiority of force, and the Russians striving to delay rather than to arrest their advance. It was not until Mukden that the single line of railway from Russia had brought to General Kouropatkin a fair equality of force; and he had to contend then with the tradition of retreat which had been perforce established in his army, and with the growing paralysis of his Home government confronted by a great revolutionary movement. Even so, Mukden was a defeat and not a rout.



The war with Japan convinced intelligent Russians of the pressing need for constitutional and administrative reform in their country. A despotism which is efficient can withstand challenge. The Russian despotism had proved inefficient and there was a clear call to seek if there were greater strength to be found in a broader basis of government. A Russian constitutional reform party began to gather strength. With that party it was the writer's

good fortune to have some happy relations when he was in Australia of the Some members of the Russian Liberal Party thought that the study of Australian conditions would have a special value, for their problem was to decide whether traditions of Parliamentary government could survive transplantation from Great Britain, where they had had centuries of slow growth, to a new land. One Mission came out to Australia. Other Russian Liberals carried on investigations by correspondence. I think that finally it was recognized that the test of the transplantation to Australia of British political ideals had no conclusive value as an argument for their application to Russian conditions, since the Australians were simply a British people who had changed their residence, not a new people; and the general conclusion of Russian patriots was that Russia would need to proceed cautiously and slowly on the path of Parliamentary government.

That was the conclusion of patriotic Russians. It did not, of course, touch the minds of the Nihilist sect—the immediate precursors of the Russian element in the Bolshevik Party. The Russian people—in the mass kindly, simple, superstitious—have yet

shown at various times an exceptional capacity to produce fanatics. The perverted ideas of some of the primitive Christians, of the zealots of the African Church, exterminated elsewhere, survived in Russia through the ages. They may be noted outcropping quite recently in the Stundists (part of whose religious faith was the emasculation of males as an efficacious means of bringing the wickedness of the world to an end); in the Doukhobors and other sectaries. These perverted ideas, originally religious in origin, sometimes lost their religious motive and survived as a purely The professors of them were the great enemies of all progressive reform in Russia, as may be illustrated by their murder of Alexander II on the eve of his proclamation of a Liberal Constitution as far back as 1881.

Students of history will recall the gleam of light this generous and romantic Alexander brought into the generally gloomy story of Czardom. Fortune gave to him a great and unselfish love, that of Catherine Michailovna. From her he gained counsels of wisdom and kindness. As M. Paléologue records:

With Catherine Michailovna he could open his heart without reserve. From her he had.

nothing to fear. Having renounced the world, cloistered in her love, she had no clique behind her. What they said to one another no one else knew. The world they shared was encompassed within their own arms. And so when a political difficulty preoccupied the Czar it was nearly always at his mistress's side that he found its solution and felt his decision define itself. The simple fact that he had no need to keep a watch on his tongue enabled him to think more clearly.

Alexander II in 1880 married Catherine Michailovna and in 1881 wished to crown her, a commoner, as his consort. Partly as an acknowledgment of his love of her, partly as a means of reconciling his people to this step, he signed, March 12th, 1881, a manifesto announcing the introduction of a representative element into the Imperial Administration, "the first act restricting autocratic omnipotence." The manifesto was to have been issued on Monday, March 14th. On the afternoon of the 13th, Alexander was killed by a Nihilist bomb—one instance of many when the hopes of a reasonable. Russian progress to freedom were blighted by murderous fanaticism.

Opposed by the superstitious bigotry of the Church and by the spirit of destruction of the

Nihilists, far more than by the reluctance of the Czars to modify their autocratic powers, the Russian Reform movement progressed but slowly. But the picture, commonly presented of pre-war Russia, as a country of callous and cruel tyranny, was not a true one. It was a kindly, humane, woefully inefficient national organization. I never had a clearer impression of it than from a humble Sydney Quaker, one James Neave, who by a strange opportunity was able to investigate Russian life thoroughly just after the last of the Czars came to the throne.

"The Russians are a gentle, Christian people, I tell thee, and the Czar a gentle, Christian man. I speak as I know." That was his verdict.

The opportunity for arriving at it came very strangely. Reports were coming to the outside world of the persecution in Russia of a sect akin to the Quakers, because the members of this sect would not submit to serve in the army. Neave dreamed that the Lord came to him and told him to go to Russia to see the Czar to plead for these sectaries and so abate the wrath of the persecution.

A very practical Quaker was Neave. He

had no money to go to Russia. He concluded in his mind that if the Lord wished him to go to Russia the Lord would send him the means to go, and so let the matter rest for many months.

Then he dreamed again as before, and the next day an unexpected legacy of £200 came to him. Neave saw in this, to use his own phrase, "the hand of the Lord," and set forth for Russia. On his way he visited England, and a friend of the Society of Quakers there resolved to go with him. They took no letters of introduction. "We leaned on the arm of the Lord."

Imagine now a peasant of some foreign country, with just a tale of a dream to advance as his business, coming to our own England, free and enlightened and popularly-governed as it is, to upbraid the monarch! What trouble would he have to get an audience? Accept for a moment the idea that the Russian Czarist Government was a cruel tyranny. Then picture the likely fate of Neave and his companion. To Siberia, surely, with much knouting by the way, would their path trend. What actually happened Neave told me, and years after I had his story confirmed by the

chaplain to the British Embassy at St. Petersburg.

"We came to the vast city of St. Petersburg like pilgrims, carrying no scrip. To all who asked of us our business we said. 'We come in the name of the Lord on His business.' All were kind, but we could not for a very long time get to see anyone of power. I knew nothing of Russian except our password. One day, as the Lord directed it, going to the office of one of the Ministers, I spoke to a man passing, asking of him direction. 'What dost thou want?' he asked. 'I come in the name of the Lord,' I said. 'Then in the name of the Lord enter,' he said, and took me to his office. He was the Minister himself. Then as the Lord directed, the path was made easy. The Czar saw us. He granted us the right to go to see for ourselves what was the state of the oppressed. He asked us to report to him on what we saw. We did so, and left Russia, trusting in the Lord's power that all would be well."

Neave learned afterwards that at least some good was done by his pilgrimage, conditions being made easier for the sectaries. Of course, as a Quaker, he could not be got to admit that citizens who refused military service rightly

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came under the anger of authority. But he was satisfied as to the good result of his mission. Asked what was his impression of the Czar, Neave answered, "He was a simple Christian man like myself." For the Russian people, for the Russian officials, Neave had nothing but praise. He found them all kind and all courteous in response to his watchword, "I come in the name of the Lord."

But the incompetence of Russians to administer their own affairs led to the entry of a large German element into the bureaucracy. In August, 1914, Russia went into the World War under a despotic Czar, honest, well-meaning but weak, much under the influence of his Consort, who in turn was under the influence of the superstitious zealots of the Church; the inner administration largely in German hands; the Nihilist sect at home and abroad intensifying its mission of destruction; the people, brave but ignorant, having few good, trustworthy leaders.

Confusion, great unnecessary disasters, were inevitable. The final calamity might have been avoided if it had not occurred to the German Powers, as a war measure of desperate unscrupulousness, to collect from every possible

quarter exiled Russian Nihilists, to reinforce them with any alien anarchists willing to help, to equip them with the necessary material and to inject them into the Russian body corporate as a paralysing poison. Thus the Bolsheviks seized the power of the Czars and substituted for a kindly, inefficient, corrupt despotism the most unscrupulous machine of national destruction that humanity has ever known.



Russia to-day has no place in the world: cannot take up her rightful duty as one of the guardians of a Pacific policy which would safeguard China in its development to a modern nation, and which would keep that ocean free from domination by any one Power. But Russia will rise again, slowly, since the Bolsheviks have exterminated or exiled those competent to be the natural leaders of the people; but surely she will rise again, and then will be in the position to assist a good, or to challenge a bad, system in the Pacific Ocean.

CHAPTER III

THE POSITION OF JAPAN

ROUSING UP JAPAN AND ITS RESULTS—THE PART TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES—EARLY JAPANESE OBJECTION TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION—THE EFFECTS OF MUKDEN—JAPAN'S REALIST POLICY IN THE WORLD WAR—JAPAN'S AMBITION TO DOMINATE CHINA.

STORY racy of their own soil must often come to the minds of United States statesmen when considering Japan's position in the Pacific—that

story of the man who chased a grizzly bear and unfortunately caught it. The United States was the chief knocker at the door of sleeping Japan in the nineteenth century. The misfortune of getting one's desires has never been better exemplified in the world's history than in the results which have followed. Japan awoke, and has been a difficult problem since.

Those who battered at the barred doors of the land of the Mikado had the idea that there was plunder, trade or some other tangible benefit —not a new and dangerous rivalry—to be got

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from forcing the Yellow Recluse out of his retirement. Without a foreboding, every civilized Power that had a fighting ship and the time to spare, took some part in urging Japan to awake and be modern. A great deal of gunpowder was burned before the Asiatic nation stirred. Then she seemed in a flash to learn the whole lesson of our combative civilization recognition of the importance of naval and military strength; of the value of cheap labour and of machinery in industry; of the thrift of aseptic surgery and preventive medicine; of the high morality of exploiting weak neighbours —all these were suddenly added to the mental equipment of an Asiatic people, and all used in rivalry with White civilization. Soon Japan was the greatest warrior Power in Asia, and a powerful combatant in that relentless war for markets which is the peace-time passion of nations.

As sailors, soldiers, merchants and factory hands, the Japanese showed themselves at once very wideawake. With a discipline which no European race would think possible of achievement—unless, perhaps, the Italians of this decade—they pursued the methods of an eclectic philosophy in their national organization: copied the best from the German and

French army systems, and from the British naval system; adopted the most efficient of the industrial machinery of Europe and America. including a scientific tariff. Nothing that seemed likely to be profitable was neglected. Even the value of religion in national policy was closely considered, and these awakened people seemed at one time on the point of a simultaneous national adoption of some form of Christianity, but either were too puzzled to choose between the varieties of Christianity or were convinced on reflection that nothing of Europe's or America's success in this world was due to religion; and, unconcerned for the moment with anything that was not of this world, decided not to "scrap" Shintoism and send it to the museum where reposed the twohandled sword of the Samurai

This miracle of the complete transformation of a race has been accomplished within half a century under our very eyes. There are living people who can recall the Japanese who were content with a secluded life on their hungry islands, where they painted dainty pictures, wove quaint and beautiful fabrics, cultivated children and flowers in a spirit of happy artistry, and pursued tribal wars among themselves as a

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sport without any ideas of foreign conquest. But those who have been able to observe it cannot offer any sound explanation of the transformation. The most patient search gives no certain guidance as to the causes of Japan's sudden advance to a position amongst the world's great nations. If we could accurately determine those causes it would probably give a valuable clue to the study of the psychology of races. But the effort to do so is vain.

An analogy is sometimes drawn between the Japanese and the British. Except that both are island races, there are few points of resemblance. The British islands, inhabited originally by the Britons, had their human stock enriched from time to time by the Romans, the Danes, the Teutons, the Normans. The British race. in part Celtic, in part Roman, in part Danish, in part Anglo-Saxon, in part Norman, grew up naturally as a hard-fighting, stubborn, adventurous type, fitted for the work of exploration and colonization. But the Japanese had, so far as can be ascertained, little advantage from cross-breeding. Probably the chief stock was originally a Tartar race. (The Finns seem to be cousins.) The primitive inhabitants of the islands were the Hairy Ainus, who still survive

in small numbers. Like the aborigines of Australia, the Ainus were a primitive rather than a degraded type, closely allied to the ancestors of the European races. Probably the Tartar invaders who colonized Japan came by way of Corea, and in Corea gained some civilization. After their advent, no new element was introduced to give the racial stock in Japan a fresh stimulus; and that original Tartar breed, though vigorous and warlike, has not founded elsewhere any great and stable nation.

In the sixth century of the Christian era, Chinese civilization and the Buddhistic religion came to the Japanese, who at the time had about the same standard of culture as the Red Indians of the American continent when Mayflower sailed. For some four centuries the Japanese were tributary to the Chinese, and during that time there was evolved a national religion, Shintoism, which probably represented the old Tartar faith modified by Chinese philosophy. Subsequently Japan in her national organization closely resembled feudal Europe. Europe, there was a service tenure for the land; a system by which organized groups became answerable collectively for the deeds of each member of the group; and, as in feudal Europe,

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Church and State made rival claims to supreme power. Frequent fighting between rival feudal lords, a constant strife between the Shoguns, representing the priestly power, and the Mikados, representing the civil power, fill the islands' history for century after century. Through it all there is nothing to indicate the evolution of those latent powers which were to come to maturity, as in an hour, during the nineteenth century. Japan appeared to be an average example of a semi-civilized country, which would be very slow to evolve to a much higher state because of the undisciplined quarrelsomeness of her people.

In the sixteenth century Europe first made the acquaintance of Japan. Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British traders and explorers visited the country. St. Francis Xavier established missions there and baptized many in the Christian faith. After two centuries of general toleration, with intervals of welcome and other intervals of hostility, Japan, in 1741, ordered the last of the Europeans out of the islands, having decided that she wanted neither the religion, the trade, nor the friendship of the White Man. The same prohibition was applied at the same time to Chinese traders.

Japan seems to have learned nothing from her first contact with European civilization. She settled down to the old policy of rigorous exclusiveness, and to a renewal of tribal and religious warfare, in the midst of which, like a strange flower in a rocky cleft, flourished a dainty æstheticism. The nineteenth century thus dawned on Japan, a bitterly poor country, made poorer by the devotion of so much of her energies to internal warfare and by the devotion of some of her scanty supply of good land to the cultivation of flowers instead of grain. The observer of the day could hardly have imagined more unpromising material for the making of the modern Japanese nation, organized with complete thoroughness for naval, military and industrial warfare.

The United States, in 1853, led the way in the successful attempt of White civilization to open up trade relations with Japan. The method was rude; and it was followed by resolute offers of "friendship," backed by armed threats, from Great Britain, France, Russia and Portugal. The Japanese wanted none of them: wished to be left to their flowers and their family feuds. But the White Man insisted. In 1864 a combination of Powers

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forced the Straits of Shimonoseki. The Japanese were compelled by these and other outrages into national unity. In the face of a foreign danger, family feuds were forgotten, and by 1869 Japan had organized her domestic policy on a basis which has kept internal peace ever since (with the exception of the revolt of the Satsuma in 1884), and had resolved on challenging Russia on the issue of supremacy in the North-West Pacific. Within a quarter of a century the new nation had established herself as a Power by the sensational defeat, on land and sea, of China. The Peace of Shimonoseki extended her territory to Formosa and the Pescadores, filled her treasury with a great war indemnity and gave her a footing on the Asiatic mainland (of this last she was for a time deprived by the interference of Europe, an interference which was not repeated when. later, having defeated Russia in war and having won an alliance with Great Britain, she was allowed to annex Corea).

From the Peace of Shimonoseki (1895) the progress of Japan has been marvellous. In 1900 she appeared as one of the civilized Powers which invaded China with a view to impress on that Empire the duty of maintaining internal

order a semi-civilized country owed to the world. In 1902 she entered into a defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain, by which she was guaranteed a ring clear from interference on the part of any European combination in the struggle with Russia which she contemplated. The conditions created by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 developed naturally to the Battle of Mukden, the culminating point of a campaign in which for the first time for many years a Yellow Race vanquished a White Race in war. That Battle of Mukden not only fully established Japan's position in the world, it also awakened the dormant arrogance of all Asia, that arrogance beside which White Race pride is insignificant: the arrogance of the Persian Darius sending to the Greeks for earth and water in acknowledgment that "Persia ruled the land and the oceans"; of the Huns regarding the White Men whom they conquered as something lower than animals; of the Turks comparing them to that unclean beast, the dog; of the Chinese compelling the first European ambassadors to their land to crawl on their knees with abject humility to the feet of the Chinese dignitaries.

In his secret heart—of which the European

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mind knows so little—the Asiatic, whether he be Japanese, Chinese, or Indian, holds a deep disdain for the White. Mukden brought that disdain out in the open and was an event more important than any since the fall of Constantinoble. For centuries the hegemony of the White Races had been unquestioned; issues regarding supremacy had arisen among the different European Powers, but there was never any doubt as to the superiority of the European race over all coloured races. Now doubts arose again: and memories, perhaps, of the Ottoman invasion of the fourteenth century. which brought the banners of Asia up to the walls of Vienna, swept the Levant of Christian ships, and threatened even the Adriatic; and which has left the Turks still in possession of Constantinople. Doubt even came to Great Britain whether the part she had played as a diplomatic friend to this Asiatic infant of wonderful growth had been a wise one. A peace was practically forced upon Japan (the United States usefully intervening as mediator), a peace which secured for her nothing in the way of indemnity, something of territory, but not the complete elimination of her enemy from the Asiatic coast; and not the full stage of

progress she had hoped for in the policy of making China her appanage.

Subsequent patient effort achieved more. Corea was definitely absorbed, Manchuria sapped, some progress made in a pacific industrial penetration of China, in spite of the obstacles of Chinese hatred and contempt.

Then from the other side of the Pacific came a warning. The war with Spain had brought the United States near to the Asiatic coast and had helped to convince her that in the control of the Pacific Ocean, and consequently in safeguarding China against absorption by Japan, she had a vital interest. It became more clear every day that America would not agree to the North-Western Pacific becoming a Japanese lake. British diplomacy could not contemplate the idea of having to support in war Japan against the United States, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was modified to avoid that possibility. At the same time Russia and Great Britain, with France as the liaison officer, moved towards a resumption of cordial relations.

A waiting policy in the assertion of special rights in China was thus entailed upon Japan until the World War created another good opportunity. That almost put China in her grasp.

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It would be absurd to criticize Japan for adopting a strictly realist policy in the World War. Credit must be given to her sagacity in "picking the winner," and declaring war on the right side, though if all the secrets of diplomacy were published it would probably be disclosed that at one stage she was doubtful whether her money was on the right horse and considered the wisdom of changing her backing. On the open facts she adhered loyally to the cause of the victorious Alliance, was in every stage absolutely correct in her attitude, whilst politely avoiding any expensive commitments. What nation has the right to cast a stone at Japan because her killed in the war totalled about 300 out of a total of 12,831,000 dead on the side of the victors and 8,388,000 dead on the side of the vanquished? Or to blame her because, with this small sacrifice, she was able to acquire valuable territorial and strategic concessions in the North Pacific? Or to blame her if she attempted to exploit fully the opportunity which the World War gave of obtaining full suzerainty over China—the ultimate objective, without a doubt, of her national policy? The worst that can be said of Japan is that she followed the accepted methods of

European and American diplomacy and played for her own hand.

Japan, on the outbreak of the World War. gave Germany notice to quit Kiao-chau, a strategic position on the Chinese mainland; on August 23, 1914, declared war on Germany; and on November 5, 1914, captured Kiao-chau with the assistance (probably unwelcome) of a British contingent. In January, 1915, the famous Twenty-One Demands were made upon China, then a neutral country. The effect of these demands was to grant to Japan such special privileges on Chinese Territory and in Chinese administration as virtually to constititute her a suzerain Power. China was helpless to resist; no Power in Europe was in the position to interfere: the United States did not choose to do so; and a series of Japanese-Chinese treaties embodied the chief of the Twenty-One Demands, including a lease for 99 years of Port Arthur and the province of Kwantung.

For three years of the World War Japan steadily and without interference pursued her policy of acquiring control of China. But the declaration of war against Germany by the United States in April, 1917, followed in August,

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1917, by a declaration of war against Germany by China and the collapse of Russia as a member of the Alliance, profoundly changed the situation. The United States, with a vital interest in protecting China against Japanese annexation, was now a partner in the Alliance. China, too, was in a position to put her case before the Alliance; and since Russia was out of the war a British force could land at Vladivostock. The issue was no longer between Japan and China alone.

At the Versailles Peace Conference, in spite of the opposition of Japan, the Twenty-One Demands came up for review, though a very cursory and incomplete review, since the European Powers had matters nearer home to take up their attention, and the United States was more intent on helping Europe to come to an impossible hotch-potch of rapacity and idealism than in looking after her own direct interest, the post-war position in the Pacific.

The Washington Conference (1921–22) gave the Demands more attention. Japan at first refused the Chinese request for the examination and revision of the Treaties based on the Twenty-One Demands; then agreed to some material concessions, and in theory at least

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admitted that she could not play a lone hand on the Asiatic mainland. But as regards the position of Japan in the Far East, the most important result of the Washington Conference was the abrogation of the British-Japanese treaty. True, that Treaty had been rendered almost useless as a bulwark to any aggressive action on the part of Japan by the terms of its renewal in 1911, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of China and the preservation of the common interests of all Powers there, and expressly stipulated that neither party to the Treaty should be called upon to go to war to support the other against a third Power, with which there existed a Treaty of General Arbitration. Yet even in its modified form the Treaty had had a prestige value: and its abrogation was a public notice to the world that in Pacific questions the British Empire had resumed full liberty to follow a line of policy independent of that of Japan.



Now again a waiting policy is obligatory for Japan if she still cherishes the ambition to dominate China; and this time she must wait for what should be, in all reason, the impossible

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—a clash between the British Empire and the United States in the Pacific. As the ally of one against the other, she could bargain for a good price; or as the residuary legatee, after they had destroyed one another in a strife which would be in the real sense of the word fratricidal, she could take what she wanted. In the face of a joint policy on their part she is helpless alone, and has no hope of any useful ally. If she still holds to her old ambition, still waits, it is only in the hope of a British-American disagreement. So soon as she recognizes that that hope is vain she will reconcile herself to a policy of peaceful co-operation in the Pacific; for hari-kari is not likely to be favoured as a national policy.

True, there is talk of the Japanese trying out the issue with the United States on the basis of an alliance with Mexico. But the venture would seem to be too rash to commend itself to a people who have great courage, but also great discipline to safeguard against courage becoming desperation. That the Japanese can hardly be tempted by resentment into a wild action was shown in 1924 when they presented to the United States Government a Note pointing out that "grave consequences" to the relations between the United States and Japan would

follow if the "Gentlemen's Agreement" regarding Japanese immigration were abrogated. The reply of the United States Senate to that was the unanimous acceptance of an amendment to the Immigration Bill which absolutely prohibited all Japanese immigration, except diplomatic representatives, members of the learned professions and students. But no "grave consequences" developed then.

This discussion of the Japanese position has not any offensive intention towards a great people, for whose qualities of patriotism, discipline and industry all must have a deep respect. It is not wickedness on their part to believe that Asia and the Pacific Ocean would be the better for Japanese domination. (If it were wickedness it is, at any rate, a wickedness taught to them, forced on them, by Europe and America.) But it is not convenient, in the general interests of civilization, for others to fall in with that Japanese belief, and the ambition on which it is founded will never be realized except as the result of Anglo-American disagreement.

CHAPTER IV

THE POSITION OF CHINA

CHINA'S INEFFICIENCY AS A NATIONAL FORCE—THE FINE CHARACTER
OF THE CHINESE—THEIR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CIVILIZATION
—EARLY HISTORY OF CHINA—THE INFLUENCE OF JAPAN—
CHINA AS A REPUBLIC—HER PRESENT HELPLESSNESS.

HINA—in area larger than Europe, with great natural resources, and with a population variously estimated at from 300,000,000 to 400,000,000 people, who, when they come into competition with other working races of the world, show themselves superior in energy and in thrift and, unless they are rigorously excluded from a territory, soon dominate its industrial position—is yet, as a factor in the problems of the Pacific, as helpless as a stranded whale. The rival parties there look upon her either as a victim to be exploited or as a helpless creature to be saved in spite of herself. The Japanese would like to impose on her their organization, and the Bolsheviks their disorganization; whilst the European Powers and the United States-

whatever wrongs they may have committed towards her in the past—must aim now, in sheer self-defence, to protect and to help her towards a peaceful development.

What is the reason of China's helpless inefficiency as a national force? It is as hard to explain as the miraculous efficiency of the Japanese.

Unlike Japan, China has immense natural resources: her area of fertile, well-watered agricultural land is the greatest, probably, of that of any nation in the world; her coal resources and iron ore resources are at least equal to those of any rival; she has oil, copper and other wealth. The agricultural resources of the country are exploited with great industry and with a skilful knowledge of fertilization and the rotation of crops, though with primitive machinery; abroad the Chinese are renowned for a certain type of agricultural skill and will gain crops from areas which other peoples look upon as hopeless. The mineral resources of the country are but little developed, but abroad the Chinese are good miners. Nor is there any lack of financial and commercial skill in the Chinese race: in open competition in any new country the Chinese colonist will take a leading

place as financier and as merchant. The position is—taking the Japanese level as the standard of comparison—that the Chinese are the better individuals in physique, in mental equipment and in the capacity for taking the long view and the honest view in negotiation. But, when the masses of the individuals, the two nations, are considered in the light of their achievements, the Chinese are in a position of hopeless inferiority.

What is apparently lacking in the Chinese character is a national sense, or even a community sense. This lack shows in many ways. Thus the individual Chinese in his dealings practises a high standard of honesty. In my experience his "word is his bond": and all bankers who have dealings with them endorse this. Lately I referred the question to that eminent Far Eastern banker, Mr. T. H. Whitehead, who was head for many years of one of the leading Exchange Banks in China. He agreed that the Chinese individually have a high tradition of financial and commercial integrity.

But when the Chinese come into business relations not with an individual or a firm but with a government, whether it is a foreign

government or one of their own making, all their ideas of honesty vanish and are replaced with the spirit of corruption and "squeeze"—that word always in use in China as an euphemism for bribery. They simply do not seem able to comprehend any national idea.

One explanation offered is that this comes from the teachings of Confucius; with ancestor reverence inculcated as the chief principle of conduct, making the family the ultimate limit of the principle of cohesion; and teaching passive resistance to wrong, contempt for national aspirations coming as a natural result. But there are other religious philosophies in their essence equally hostile to personal and to national pride, and peoples professing to follow them find no practical difficulty in reconciling God and Mammon: Christian nations, for example, do not follow a rule of meekness. And, though the Chinese show no sense of ethical responsibility in their relations with a national organization, even though it is of their own making, they are by no means without a national pride (or prejudice) of a very violent sort.

I hazard the theory that the Chinese want of a sense of national conduct is due to the fact that through their many thousands of years

of history they have tried everything and become disillusioned with everything in the way of state organization, and so have arrived at an attitude of tired disdain: that their attitude towards "progress" is not of people who are too exhausted for effort, but too experienced to try. China has in the past experimented with most of the varinted "notions" of civilization, from gunpowder to a peerage chosen by competitive examination (a House of Lords reform which has not suggested itself even to modern British Radicals). and long ago came to the conclusion that all was vanity and vexation of spirit. If that theory is sound it will take many years of patient effort before any "Reform Party" in China will be able to re-vitalize in its mass any sense of national responsibility.

Yet the Chinese are not a humble race. The name of "Heavenly Kingdom" given to the land by its inhabitants, the grandiose titles assumed by its rulers, the degrading ceremonies which used to be exacted from foreigners visiting China as confessions of their inferiority to the "Celestials," show an extravagant pride of race. In the thirteenth century, when Confucian China, alike with Christian Europe,

had to fear the growing power of the militant Mohammedans, a Treaty of Alliance was suggested between France and China; and the negotiations were broken off because of the claim of China that France should first submit to her as vassal! The Chinese idea of their own importance has not abated since then. Their attitude towards the "foreign devils" is still one of contempt. But, at present, that contempt has not the backing of naval and military strength, and so in practice counts for nothing.



China cherishes the oldest of living civilizations. Her legendary history dates back to 2404 B.C., her actual history to 875 B.C., when a high state of mental culture had been reached; and an advanced material civilization also, though some caution is necessary in accepting the statements that at that time China knew the use of the mariner's compass and of printing type. But certainly weaving, pottery, metalworking and pictorial art flourished. The height to which religious philosophy had attained, centuries before the Christian era, is shown by the teachings of Confucianism and Taoism.

Political science had been also cultivated and there were at an early period Chinese Socialists to claim that "every one should sow and reap his own harvest."

There seem to have been at least two great parent races of the present population of the Chinese Empire—a race dwelling in the valleys and turning its thoughts to peace and the arts, and a race dwelling on the high steppes and seeking joy in war, which sent several waves of attack westward towards Europe, under chiefs the greatest of whom was Gengis Khan. the race of the valleys, stolid, patient, laborious, established ultimately racial superiority, gradually absorbing the more martial elements and producing modern China with its contempt for warlike glory. The Mongols, who failed to dominate China, yet in their wars made a deep impression on the Middle Ages, founding tributary Kingdoms in Persia, Turkestan and as far west as the Russian Volga.

The earliest record of European relations with China dates from the seventh century, when the Emperor Theodosius sent an embassy to the Chinese Emperor. In the thirteenth century Marco Polo visited the Court of Pekin, and for some time fairly constant communication

between Europe and China was maintained by caravans across Asia. Christian missionaries settled in China, and in 1248 there is a record of the Pope and the Chinese Emperor (or Grand Khan) exchanging greetings.

When towards the end of the fourteenth century the Ming dynasty supplanted the Mongol dynasty, communication with Europe was broken off for more than a century. In 1581 Jesuit missionaries again entered China, and the Manchu dynasty, which replaced the Ming in the seventeenth century, at first protected the Christian faith and seemed somewhat to favour Western ideas. But in the next century the Christian missions were persecuted and almost extirpated, to be revived in 1846. From that date "the mailed fist" of Europe exacted from the Chinese a forced tolerance of European trade and missions.

The tolerance was of sullen, patient contempt, with nothing in it of a desire to imitate the methods of the "foreign devils." That desire had its first prompting from the unsuccessful war with Japan. The Chinese do not regard the Japanese as their equals but as their inferiors. Yet they found themselves humbled by their inferiors, who had learned the Western

arts of warfare. Many Chinese turned then their thoughts to the idea of adopting at any rate enough of Western civilization to be able to kill more efficiently. The Peace of Shimonoseki (1895) was the starting point of a Chinese national movement based on some acceptance of Western ideas.

A great accession of strength came to that movement in 1900 when Chinese resentment of foreign intrusions, smouldering for long, broke out in the savage fanaticism of the Boxer outbreak. This led to a joint punitive expedition by the European Powers, in conjunction with Japan. China had the mortification then of being scourged not only by the "White Devils" but also by an upstart Yellow Man, who was her near and her despised neighbour. So much of China as knew of the expedition to Pekin in 1900, and understood its significance, seems to have resolved then on some change of national policy involving the acceptance of European methods, in warfare at least.

China saw Japan treated with respect, herself with contumely, humiliated in war and in diplomacy by an upstart cousin. The reason was plain, the conclusion equally plain. China began to arm and set the foundations

of a modern naval and military system. A national spirit began to show, too, in industry. Chinese capital claimed its right and its duty to develop the resources of China. All this was, of course, the work of a few prominent men only: their ideas did not touch the mass of the people.

But early in the twentieth century, "modern ideas" had so far established themselves in China that Grand Councillor Chang Chih-tung was moved to memorialize the Throne with

these suggestions for reform:

(1) That the Government supply funds for free education.

(2) That the Army and Navy be reorganized

without delay.

(3) That able and competent officials be secured for Government services.

(4) That Princes of the Blood be sent abroad

to study.

(5) That arsenals for manufacturing arms, ammunitions and other weapons of war, and docks and shipbuilding yards for constructing warships, be established without delay.

(6) That only Chinese capital be invested in railway and mining enterprises.

(7) That a date be given for the granting of a Constitution.

Chang Chih-tung's book, Chuen Hsueh Pien (China's Only Hope), the gospel of the Chinese reformers, stated at this time:

In order to render China powerful, and at the same time preserve our own institutions, it is absolutely necessary that we should utilize Western knowledge. But unless Chinese learning is made the basis of education, and a Chinese direction given to thought, the strong will become anarchists, and the weak slaves. Thus the latter end will be worse than the former. . . . Travel abroad for one year is more profitable than study at home for five years. It has been well said that seeing is a hundred times better than hearing. One year's study in a foreign institution is better than three years in a Chinese. Mencius remarks that a man can learn foreign things abroad; but much more benefit can be derived from travel by older and experienced men than by the young, and high mandarins can learn more than petty officials.

That was sound reasoning; in particular let there be noted his warning, since most unhappily proved to be well-founded by the effects of Russian Bolshevik agitation, against the danger of putting new foreign wine into the old jars of China.

After the Russian-Japanese War, Chinese students went to Japan in thousands, and these students laid the foundation of the "Republican" school of reformers which have plunged the country into deeper misery. The flow of students to Japan was checked by the then Chinese Imperial Government, for the reason that Republican sentiments seemed generally to be absorbed in the atmosphere of Japan, despite the absolutism of the Government there. In the United States and in Europe the Chinese scholar was thought to be able, however, to absorb Western knowledge without acquiring Republican opinions! There is some suggestion of a grim jest on the part of the then Chinese Government in holding this view. It recalls Boccaccio's story of the Christian who despaired of the conversion of his Jewish friend when he knew that he contemplated a visit to Rome; and seemed to argue that a safe precaution against acquiring Republican views is to live in a Republican country.

Chinese confidence in the educational advantages offered by the United States was in some measure justified by results. Americaneducated Chinese became prominent in several phases of the Reform movement in China.

The first Reform Foreign Minister in China, the first great native Chinese railway builder, the first Chinese women doctors and native Chinese bankers, were early good results of American training. But in time Americantrained Chinese began to bring home, as well as practical knowledge, revolutionary political ideas.

* *

The Chinese Empire came to a sudden end in 1912 when the Manchu dynasty abdicated, and the boy Emperor issued the following edict:

We, the Emperor, have respectfully received the following Edict from her Majesty the

Dowager:

In consequence of the uprising of the Republican Army, to which the people in the Province have responded, the Empire seethed like a boiling cauldron, and the people were plunged in misery. Yuan Shih-kai, therefore, commanded the despatch of Commissioners to confer with the Republicans with a view to a National Assembly deciding the form of Government. Months elapsed without any settlement being reached. It is now evident that the majority of the people favour a Republic, and, from the preference of the people's hearts, the will of Heaven is discernible. How could

we oppose the desires of millions for the glory of one family? Therefore, the Dowager Empress and the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the people. Let Yuan Shih-kai organize with full powers a provisional Republican Government, and let him confer with the Republicans on the methods of establishing a union which shall assure the peace of the Empire, and of forming a great Republic, uniting Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans.

This edict was annotated by a prominent Chinese statesman in Europe in a statement (January, 1912):

None of the dynasties in China have ever maintained a tyrannical régime for any length of time, least of all the Manchu dynasty, the policy of which has consisted rather of a mixture of paternalism and obscurantism than of hard repression of the people. . . The present unanimous desire of the Chinese to remove the Manchu dynasty arises solely from the fact that the Chinese have fully awakened to the realization that only a policy of thorough-going Westernization can save China from disruption and partition. The removal of the Manchu dynasty is of no greater national moment to China than would be the fall of a Cabinet to any European country.

In regard to the adoption of Republican

ideas, it may be said that the Chinese do not understand the meaning of the Republican principle, and if a new régime should declare itself Republican, its Republicanism will be of a much more strongly democratic type than any known to Europe. It will even be more popular in its constitution than the American, and will far more fully seek the development of the common weal than most bureaucratic systems bearing the name. The suggested application of Christian principles to the new régime may be regarded as wholly impossible. Confucianism, by which China stands or falls, is a secular philosophy, the only semblance of a spiritual or religious tenet in which is the principle of ancestor-worship, and though a theocratic idea is admitted in the creation of the universe, the question of a life hereafter is wholly excluded from its teachings.

What an air of unreality is given, both to the Imperial edict of abdication and to this comment of a Chinese statesman, by the references to "the majority of the Chinese people favouring a Republic," to the "unanimous desire" of those people to remove the Manchu Emperors. It is in Eastern form the claptrap of the tailors of Tooley Street, laying down the law as "We, the people of England"!

had come to the front as its head—might have made good if it had substituted an efficiently despotic President for the inefficiently despotic Emperor. It would not have been a Republic in any accepted sense of the term, but the name would not have mattered: of the hundreds of millions of ancestor-worshipping Chinese not one per cent would have understood what the word was meant to convey and would have blessed any administration which did not interfere too much with the family, which kept official "squeeze" within some limits, and which preserved law and order.

The strong man might have appeared and might have succeeded with loyal help from the British Empire and the United States—it was to the manifest interest of both to give that help—if the World War had not come to blight the Chinese Republic in its infancy. During that war, and since, the forces which were interested in crushing the hopes of China progressing peacefully on the path of modern civilization had unrestricted play: first the Japanese with their Twenty-One Demands; later the Bolsheviks with their promotion of anarchy. So China has gone further and further each year on the road to disintegration.

Since 1911 there have been eight Presidents of the Chinese Republic, all of them dominated by some military faction or by some foreign Power: and there have been forty-three Cabinets. From 1914 to 1918 whatever central control existed was dominated by the Japanese, and I do not think it is unfair to say that that domination was disruptive in effect if not in intention. Since 1918 the chief disruptive force has been that of Bolshevik Russia. definitely aiming to draw the country into the maelstrom of the "World Revolution." What might have worked as constructive forces have been hindered by mutual jealousies, the United States being nervous of co-operating with Great Britain, France being more concerned with the possible value of China on the European chess-board than with the interests of the Chinese.

It would be tedious and unprofitable to attempt to follow in detail the quick disintegration of China into a series of mutually warring provinces under various "War Lords" whose explosive names splutter like crackers in the daily record of battles and bargains, the chief objective of which is to secure for some Chang, or Lik, or Feng, or Woo the opportunity to

"squeeze" a rich centre and to get out of the country with the loot. But there can be noted as one cheerful sign the apparent failure of the revolutionary sect of Moscow to Bolshevize China. The attempt certainly has not been abandoned finally; but its first campaign has failed, and that gives grounds for confidence that if the Chinese people are given fair play by the foreigner they will be able to produce from their own ranks leaders to restore order and to take the first steps on a cautious progress towards modernizing China.

Fair play from the foreigner is an essential condition. There must be an end to the bedevilling of China in the supposed interests of this or that ambitious Power. There are no less than twenty "Treaty Powers" in China, i.e. Powers which have acquired by Treaty special privileges. The majority of them to-day are negligible influences; indeed, only four really matter—the British Empire, the United States, Japan and France in that order of importance—and agreement between the first two would remove all danger of foreign interference making mischief in China. The Washington Conference (1921–22) built up one bulwark for the protection of Chinese national interests

by affirming the principle that no foreign nation was to be allowed any exclusive privileges in the country; the Pekin Tariff Conference (1925) yet another. But what is yet lacking is a straightforward, precise declaration, backed by overwhelming force, that no injurious interference will be permitted by any Power in the affairs of China: that when she can produce a leader giving evidence of his capacity to restore order, that leader will be protected from all foreign meddlers and will be given full moral and financial support.



Having already dared to advance a theory of the cause of Chinese national helplessness, I venture here to interpolate a suggestion as to what seems to be, in the natural order of things, the proper cure. It is not in "Republicanism," in "Parliamentary institutions," or in the other paraphernalia of "democratic government," which are beginning to be somewhat discredited even in those countries where these things came by growth. It is rather in the setting up, with the help of disinterested Powers, of a central autocracy as intelligent and as benevolent as China can provide, with

subsidiary (and also autocratic) provincial governments: all bound together in a Federal system, i.e. a system giving the Provinces the responsibility for local government, but keeping Defence, Justice, Customs, Excise in the hands of the Central government. Powers whose interest is a peaceful, progressive China—Great Britain and the United States are two such Powers—should scrap all the nonsense about equipping an illiterate population, lacking as yet any constructive national consciousness, with ballot boxes. There is no solution in hallot boxes. What the Chinese want is law and order; flood prevention; railways: then education and the gradual removal of all foreign tutelage as they find their feet.



At present China is only a source of anxiety in the Pacific, like a great treasure ship lying derelict and inviting the attention of pirates. The first step towards her security and the security of the Pacific is to mount an honest police guard: "honest" in the sense that it will safeguard, not exploit; "police" in the sense that it will have a strong arm to warn off evilly disposed foreign Powers.

CHAPTER V

AMERICA'S IMPERIAL POLICY

United States' national temper not Quakerish—Imperialism the instinctive policy of the United States—The Monroe Doctrine inspired by Great Britain—How it has been subsequently extended—Great annexations by the United States—Her relations with Latin America—The pulpit attitude of the United States.

Pacific and elsewhere) that foreign nations should better understand the spirit of the United States people, and that the United States people should better understand their own spirit. The second is more vital than the first. There is more actual danger in the United States' blindness to the motives and methods of her own policy than in the foreign misconception of those motives, though there will be some benefit in foreign nations understanding more clearly the nature of the American people, in recognizing that their actions are not, as they sometimes appear to be, purely arbitrary and motiveless, but are

the natural consequences of their breeding and environment.

The French-naturally enough, since their genius is for logical and unsentimental appreciation of facts and tendencies—come nearer than any other nation to a sound judgment of American national character. Their idea of the United States people as a young giant, yet to learn how to use a giant's power reasonably, is, perhaps, somewhat coloured by malice, but it contains an essential truth. The Britishagain naturally enough, since their genius for common sense is always liable to be deflected by sentiment—are usually farthest from a realist judgment of the other great Englishspeaking people. But foreign misunderstanding of the United States may be said to be merely of academic interest compared with the importance of the domestic self-misunderstanding of the "young giant." The great need is that the American people should be educated to the blessing of seeing themselves as others see them.

It is a real danger that the United States ascribes to herself a Quakerish temperament in foreign affairs. Those misleading catch-words of American local politics—"Republican Simplicity," "The Rights of Man," "European

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Tyranny," "Imperial Aggression," "The Vortex of Militarism," from which and like texts United States publicists are wont to preach of the tyranny of European kings and emperors, of their greed to swallow up weak neighbours, of the evils of the military and naval systems maintained in the cause of this greed—are grave obstacles to peaceful world policy. The North American Republic's habit of imagining herself as pursuing in happy contrast to other wicked peoples a simple and peaceful life, with no desire for acquiring territory, no wish to interfere with the affairs of others, in the world but not of the world, of suggesting to the "lesser tribes" to follow her high principles, is not only more than a little exasperating to the foreigner but it is actually dangerous to herself, as a false chart would be dangerous to a navigator in difficult waters.

The facts are that the United States' national temper is exactly the reverse of Quakerish and reacts instinctively to the Imperial aspirations derived from her ancestry and implicit in her national greatness. If the American citizen of to-day is considered as though he were a British citizen of some generations back, with a healthy appetite for putting things right, a

youthful certainty in the purity of his own motives and an unlimited self-confidence, that will be the truth. He may not assume the frank freebooting attitude of the Elizabethan Englishman, may always seek a moral sanction for the extension of his dominion. effect will be the same: for such a seeking is rarely made in vain when it is backed by a resolved purpose. It was sufficient for Francis Drake to know that a settlement was Spanish and rich: the attack followed. The United States patriot wants to know that a possession is foreign, is desirable, and also is ill-governed, before he will be moved to action, and will land troops "to establish neutral zones"—that excellent euphemism of St. Samuel for the invasion of neutral countries. Since few forms of administration can withstand the ordeal of foreign criticism, the practical difference is slight. The American Empire, wishing to grow with the benediction always of a high moral purpose, has grown at a very rapid rate.

At its birth, the United States was invested by an English writer of prophetic insight with the purple of Empire. The London Gazette of 1765 wrote: "Little doubt can be entertained that America will in time be the greatest and

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most prosperous Empire that the world has ever seen." The forecast was a reasonable one. A great empty area, with rich natural resources, had come into the possession of a young people springing from a vigorous race and representing in a special degree the elements of courage, endurance and aggressiveness of that race; of men of a good breed and the best of that breed for the task of nation-building-stubborn, selfconfident to a fanatical degree. The earliest American colonists honestly felt in their own hearts that what they sought was freedom, but their interpretation of the word was exclusive: it meant freedom for their own ideas and suppression of other ideas.

Hypocrisy is too harsh a word for the spirit of self-righteous intolerance of the founders of the American Commonwealth, but it is the word which naturally comes to the thoughts of many a foreign observer, confronted by an attitude of mind which he considers arbitrary and unjust, but which is so confident of its own virtue: noting actions which seem to him merely rapacious but are explained as having the justification of Divine purpose. This exasperated criticism of the foreign observer is, incidentally, in itself something of an hypocrisy,

for its motive is rarely what it pretends to be, moral reprobation, but rather envy of the efficiency of purpose which self-righteousness gives: as when Mr. Labouchere professed his disgust with Mr. Gladstone that "he always had an ace up his sleeve and always believed that the Almighty had put it here."

The American Republic in its infancy was willing, indeed anxious, to be considered as a little settlement quite outside all world politics. and it is to some extent upon the early eloquence of her founders as to the duty of the United States to confine her attention strictly to her corner of America, that a misconception of her national spirit has been built up. Those declarations, however, were dictated chiefly by prudence. Alexander Hamilton, who controlled the foreign policy of the Republic at the outset, intended that she should find her feet before taking any challenging attitude towards her neighbours in the world. In particular he was anxious that the United States should have a good moral reason why she should not, through considerations of sentiment, be drawn into the position of a mere appanage of France, to be used as a pawn in European issues. He set the foundations

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of what was known later as the "Monroe doctrine," because, at the time, a policy of non-interference with outside affairs was a necessary condition of peaceful growth for the young nation. The same idea governed Washington's farewell address in 1796 with its warning against "foreign entanglements."

Afterwards the "Monroe doctrine"—deriving its name from a message by President Monroe in 1823—was first invested with the meaning that the United States, whilst not tolerating any interference with the affairs of the American continent by Europe, would reciprocate by non-interference with European affairs. Finally the "Monroe doctrine," which had begun with an affirmation of America's non-participation in European affairs, and had developed into a declaration against European interference with American affairs, took its present form, which is, in effect, that over all America the United States has a paramount interest, which must not be questioned, and that, as regards the rest of the world, she has an equal voice with other Powers. The "Monroe doctrine" thus to-day is no instrument of humbleness—is, indeed, the most Imperialist of national attitudes.

It will be of value to recall the circumstances which led up to Mr. President Monroe's formal message in 1823 and, in particular, to stress the fact that it was at the suggestion of the British Empire that the "Monroe doctrine" was preclaimed. A very clear history of the doctrine was given by Mr. Charles E. Hughes in a speech to the American Bar Association (August, 1923). Tracing its genesis he pointed out that when the Holy Alliance (Austria, France, Prussia, Russia) threatened to restore monarchical rule in the Spanish South American colonies, which had declared their independence, Mr. George Canning, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Mr. Richard Rush, American Minister in London, suggesting a joint Anglo-American declaration that the recovery of the South American colonies by Spain was hopeless: that neither Great Britain nor the United States was aiming at the possession of any portion of these colonies: but they could not see with indifference any portion of them transferred to any other Power. The United States did not welcome the idea of a joint declaration, but preferred to make a separate declaration of policy, and this was formulated in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823.

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Supplementing Mr. Hughes' facts: the dawn of the nineteenth century found the young American nation, after about a quarter of a century's existence, fairly on her feet: able to vindicate her rights abroad by a war against the Barbary pirates: given by the cession of Louisiana from France, a magnificent accession of territory. The Empire of Spain was crumbling to pieces and the Latin-American Republics in South and Central America were being established on the ruins of that Empire. Spain, her attention engaged in European wars, was for a time able to do little or nothing to assert herself against the rebellious colonies. But in 1815, Napoleon having been vanquished, the Holy Alliance in Europe attempted to reassert the old prestige of the European monarchies. The terror of Napoleon's name had forced the kings of the earth into a union which put national differences into a secondary place and was anxious chiefly to preserve the Divine Right of Kings. The formation of this Holy Alliance was naturally viewed with suspicion in the United States, and the British people supported them in that. When in 1823 the Alliance raised the question of joint action by European monarchies to restore

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Spanish rule in South America, Great Britain dissented, suggested joint Anglo-American action, and President Monroe's famous message vetoed any European interference on the continent of America. Such European colonies as already existed would be tolerated, and that was all. The message stated:

The American continents by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power.

We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other way than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

That "Monroe doctrine" grew with the growing power of the United States and the growing strength of its Imperial spirit. In 1845 Mr. President Polk declared that no future European colony should be planted on any part of the North American continent, and set it down as the duty of the United States "to annex American territory lest it be annexed by European countries." True to that faith,

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he was responsible for the annexation of Texas, Oregon and California. The United States' claim to overlordship of North America was still more remarkably proclaimed in 1867, when a protest was entered against the Federation of the Canadian Provinces. The protest was not insisted upon then, in the face of British opposition, though in 1870 Mr. President Grant revived the spirit of the protest with his forecast of "the end of European political connection with this continent." The Venezuela controversy between Great Britain and the United States in 1895 was responsible for a yet stronger interpretation of the "Monroe doctrine." It was then claimed that "foreign colonies ought to cease in this hemisphere." Insistence on that would, however, have led to a struggle in which Great Britain would probably have had the assistance of other European Powers affected: and the "Monroe doctrine" receded a little for the time being.

As it stands to-day it may be summarized as affirming that in world politics the United States claims and exercises the privileges for which her powers and resources are the warrants; in American affairs any further European colonization in North or South

America is vetoed; and the United States must be considered as, in a sense, the suzerain Power of all the Latin-American Republics (whether they are willing or not).

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To note now in brief summary the quick development in the nineteenth century of the American Republic from the position of a recluse settlement of peaceful colonists anxious only to keep out of Europe's quarrels. The first sign of ambition to become a world power was the building of an efficient Fleet and the use of it as a police force in the Mediterranean to suppress the Barbary pirates (1802). Next the elimination of France and Spain from the North American continent expanded United States territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. In 1813 Mexico declared her independence of Spain: within the next halfcentury the United States had acquired by purchase or by conquest a million square miles (more than half the total area) of what had been Spanish Mexico.

As soon as she had reached the Pacific Coast the United States naturally turned her gaze westward across the Pacific Ocean. American

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whalers sailing out of Boston began to exploit the Pacific. Their whaling trips brought back knowledge of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Group, and, following the methods of British colonization, American missionaries were the pioneers of American domination. In 1820 Hiram Bingham preached his first sermon at Honolulu from the text, "Fear not, for, behold, I bring you glad tidings of great joy." A handsome church now marks the gratitude of his native converts. With equal propriety Bingham's American compatriots might have set up a statue to him as the first Warden of the Marches of the Pacific for the United States: for from that day the annexation of Hawaii was inevitable. The process took the familiar Imperialist course. First the United States Republic exercised a benevolent suzerainty over the Hawaiian kingdom: then the blessing of free institutions was bestowed on the natives by the foundation of an Hawaiian Republic: the next step was definite annexation.

The acquisition of Hawaii, the acquisition of Alaska from Russia, the armed interference (1854) with the Japanese policy of exclusiveness when United States warships broke a way into Japanese ports, all were natural

steps in an Imperialist policy. Another step was the decision that the task, originally undertaken by a French Company, of cutting a waterway across the Panama Isthmus should be the responsibility of the United States. British susceptibilities on the point were soothed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty guaranteeing that the canal would not be fortified, a treaty which was subsequently allowed by Great Britain to lapse in accordance with the increasing deference which the growing power of the American Republic could exact. That abrogation created the present position which gives the United States sole control of that canal, and the right to fortify its entrances.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the United States, a Power which still insists on representing herself as an essentially domestic character interested only in purely American affairs, had established herself in a commanding strategical position in the North Pacific, had broken the Japanese policy of exclusiveness and had obtained the control of the canal waterway from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The second half of the same century saw a further Imperial expansion. The misgovern-

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ment of Cuba by Spain became intolerable to American public opinion, and in 1898 war was declared, with the avowed purpose of conferring the blessings of freedom on the people If one accepted the nonsensical view that the United States is a Power lifted above our ordinary human nature by some mysterious moral alchemy, it would be difficult to understand why a war to free Cuba should also have been waged in another ocean to acquire the Philippines. But, looking at the matter in a sane light, it was natural that, being engaged in a war with Spain, the United States should strike at Spain wherever a blow was possible and should destroy the Spanish Power in the Pacific Ocean as well as in the Caribbean Sea, and should take the opportunity offered of stretching the arm of America across the Pacific to the coast of Asia.

The Filipinos were not grateful for the substitution of the strong rule of the United States for the weak rule of Spain, and American Imperialism had the experience of having to enforce, by stern warfare on the liberated, acceptance of the benefits of liberation. The experience might have taught some sympathy with older players at the game of Empire-

making: certainly it did not abate ardour in the good work; there are from time to time suggestions that the Filipinos should have restored to them the right of "self-determination": and these are even discussed with some appearance of seriousness: decision is always postponed to the Greek Kalends.

Cuba was given nominal independence after the war with Spain: and there is no objection on the part of the United States to-day to this independence being shown by Cuba sending a representative to the League of Nations. But Cuban foreign policy is under the surveillance of the American Republic. (Her position vis-à-vis Washington, in that regard, is similar to that of Egypt vis-à-vis London.) Two of her harbours, Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, are United States naval stations for the protection of the Panama Canal. domestic policy Cuban independence is "subject to good behaviour," and between 1906-9 her territory was occupied by United States forces. This is a degree of independence which the most thorough-going of Imperialists will not grudge to a subject country.

Even more convincing proof that the United States follows a policy of Imperialist expansion

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is provided by the record of her relations with certain of the Latin-American states. The Republic of Colombia up to 1903 was in possession of the Panama Isthmus through which the Panama Canal was to pass. In 1903 the Panama province of the Republic of Colombia was assisted by the United States to secede from Colombia and to set up housekeeping as an independent state. Its first important act of independence was to lease to the United States the Panama Canal area. That this partition of a friendly Republic was promoted by the United States for the better security of the Panama Canal there can be no doubt: indeed, there may be taken as a formal acknowledgment of this the Treaty of 1921 between the United States and Colombia "adjusting the loss of Panama" by paying conscience money to the extent of £5,000,000. The Republics of Honduras and Nicaragua have been placed by "loan conventions" under the practical suzerainty of the United States. From 1912 to 1925 the United States maintained an armed force on Nicaraguan territory, and during 1927 landed troops in Nicaragua "to assist to maintain order." A treaty exists with Nicaragua leasing to the United States

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a belt for the construction of another canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a naval base on the Pacific coast and two naval bases in the Caribbean Sea. The price paid for this lease is spent subject to the approval of the United States. The purpose of the arrangements was stated by Mr. President Taft in his message to Congress: "Now that the linking of the oceans by the Isthmian Canal is nearing assured realization, the conservation of stable conditions in the adjacent countries becomes a still more pressing need, and all that the United States has hitherto done in that direction is amply justified, if there were no other consideration, by the one fact that this country has acquired such vast interest in that quarter as to demand every effort on its part to make solid and durable the tranquillity of the neighbouring countries."

The United States in effect treats the small Central American states as subject territories to Washington, and justifies this on grounds of her vital interests in their neighbourhood. The justification is sound if we are to speak in terms of "Imperialism": but cannot be pleaded logically by a nation which purports to believe in the rights of small countries to shape their

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own government, or misgovernment, as they please. It is probable that the fate of Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua will be also the fate of Mexico in due course, and that from the Canadian border to the Panama Canal, American authority will run because the United States believes that the Panama Canal is too important to be left to the chances of interference from less stable governments than her own.

These statements are not made as hostile criticisms. They are indeed made with a recognition of the facts that a great nation with a belief in its destiny must be "Imperialist" in spirit because it has a natural desire to spread the blessings of its rule: that it is the law of life that a higher should supplant a lower form of organization; that the United States would be wronging not only her own interests but the interests of civilization if she allowed rowdy little nations to become general nuisances on the North American continent.

But the danger is in the fact that United States politicians and United States public opinion profess such wilful blindness to the necessary implications of American policy; insist on pretending that the United States is not an aggressively Imperialist Power: and

found on this pretence a criticism of, and interference with, other nations, and a somewhat offensive attitude that, because of their low moral standpoint in international affairs, she cannot sately walk with them.

Since 1790 the territorial expansion of the United States has been as follows:

		sq. miles.
1790.	Original area	892,135
1803.	Added by Louisiana purchase	827,987
1819.	Gained from Spain	13,435
1819.	Purchased Florida	58,666
1845.	Annexed Texas	389,166
1846.	Annexed Oregon	286,541
1848.	Annexed Mexican territory	529,189
1853.	Gadsden purchase	26,670
1867.	Purchased Alaska	590,884
1898.	Annexed Hawaiian Islands	6,449
1899.	Annexed from Spain, Porto	
	Rico, Guam, the Philippines	118,671
1900.	Portion of Samoa	77
1904.	Panama	527
1917.	Danish West Indies	132
	1928. Total Area	3,743,529
	Of which acquired since 1790	2,851,375

It is "some" expansion; but, with all the glory of it thick upon her, the United States mounts the pulpit to proclaim that she is not greedy as other nations and must safeguard her purity against any association with them.

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Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the United States has been responsible for more arbitrary aggressions against the liberty of other peoples to manage (or mismanage) their own affairs than has any European nation. That is a fact; not an accusation, because every aggression may have been excusable on grounds of expediency. But a nation, having acted thus, should not keep up a pretence that it has acted otherwise: should not make that pretence the foundation of its foreign policy.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES' POLICY IN THE WORLD WAR

Some misunderstandings of the United States' attitude—
The effort to preserve neutrality—The practical sympathy with the Allied cause—The British blockade policy—The United States a generous combatant—General Perseing's fine gesture—American soldiers good comrades.

HE importance to world peace of the United States understanding the United States—for the reason that a man who turns a blind eve to his own motives and aims is difficult in negotiation and partnership—has been the subject of the previous chapter. This chapter will deal with a misunderstanding of less importance, but still of great importance—that which exists in some of the countries which were in the Alliance against the German Powers during the World War regarding United States' policy from 1914 to 1918. There is no doubt that a certain amount of United States' suspicion and coldness towards her partners of 1918 is due to a reaction against unfair criticism on their part.

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Whilst, examined in a spirit of truth and realism, United States' world policy prior to 1914 shows as aggressively Imperialist, and the United States' pretence that it was otherwise shows as a self-righteous deception, United States' policy in relation to the World War (which is the basis for much ill-feeling against her to-day), if it is examined in that spirit of truth and realism, will show to have been fair and even generous, certainly not actuated by a spirit of exploitative Imperialism.

Yet a misunderstanding of the attitude of the United States during the World War is fairly common and has been responsible for much exasperation in European-American and in British-American relations. There are even people in whose minds the history of the World War is filled by this picturesque summary: "The Americans stayed out whilst there was money in neutrality: then joined in at the last moment to do their best out of the Peace"; and on the basis of that summary build up a fabric of bitterness.

How far is any feeling of resentment justified? Should the United States in 1914, seeing the grave danger in which Great Britain and France were involved, have intervened on their behalf

for sentimental reasons? No sensible person can answer that question in the affirmative.

As regards sentimental duty to France, whilst it is true that American Independence owed something to French intervention, it is equally true that that intervention was founded not so much on love of the American colonists as of hostility to their British antagonists. At a very early stage of the history of the North American Republic, Washington and Alexander Hamilton were firm in repudiating the idea that their country was under a debt of gratitude which would be a reason for their intervention on behalf of France in a European conflict.

As regards sentimental duty to Great Britain, what is advanced as an argument for it is usually the mischievous fallacy that the United States is not only an English-speaking country but is racially an English, or a British, country. That is not so. True, her governing element has been always chiefly of British stock, for reasons which are in part a natural sequence from the fact that the founders of the Republic were mostly British; in part because subsequent immigration was from British stock as well as foreign stocks, and the British stock is somewhat superior to other world stocks in governing

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capacity; in part because the immigrants whom the United States attracted from Britain were usually from a higher social stratum of the community than was the case with those she attracted from foreign countries. But, whilst the governing classes of the United States are drawn chiefly from people of British stock, the mass of the population is not of British origin. This fact can be easily made clear by an analysis, based on racial origins, of the United States white population in any census year.

Note the last United States census returns (those of 1920) and it will be found that about one-third of the white population that year was of foreign white stock, *i.e.* foreign-born, or having one or both parents foreign-born. The chief elements in this "foreign white stock" (totalling 36,300,000) were in that year (1920):

German			7,250,000
Austro-Hungarian			4,400,000
Irish	• •		4,100,000
Russian	• •	• •	3,800,000
British	• •	• •	3,000,000
British-Canadian	• •	• •	
	• •	• •	1,700,000
French-Canadian			850,000

At any previous census since the era of rapid growth of the United States population,

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the figures would show about the same proportions. If these figures for 1920 (and the figures in 1914, the year that the World War broke out, would be substantially the same) are examined to seek for an indication of what might reasonably be the sentimental leaning of the American people in 1914, they do not suggest intervention on the side of the Allies, but rather on the other side. It will be noted that there are 11,650,000 of German and Austrian stock against 4,700,000 of British and British-Canadian stock.

It was midsummer madness of a mad year for anyone to think in August, 1914, that there was any reason why the United States of America should intervene for a sentimental love of France or of Great Britain. If nations nowadays do go to war for sentimental affection for other parties—which is more than doubtful—there was no reason of that kind existing in the United States.

Nevertheless the sympathy of the higher classes of the United States population was to an extent engaged on the side of the Allies, because their feelings were outraged by the German violation of Belgian neutrality and by the ruthlessness which marked the occupation

of Belgium. I had direct proof of this at an early stage of the war. I was in Antwerp on August 24, 1914, when the first German Zeppelin attack was made upon that city, met there a United States doctor and was able to communicate by cable to America his account of the happenings. Subsequently I had from the United States a large number of Press extracts, from which I quote two:

The New York Times: The dropping of bombs into the city of Antwerp from a German Zeppelin airship is a crime against humanity of which civilized nations should take notice by earnest protests to the German Government. By dropping bombs upon the city the persons in control of the Zeppelin showed that they were willing to take innocent human lives, lives of men, women and children alike, in sheer wantonness, for the killing of inhabitants of Antwerp by this means can be of no possible advantage to the armies of Germany and has no rational place in her war plans.

The New York Sun: To murder wantonly and pitilessly, to slay or mangle little children and young mothers in their beds, to salute the Red Cross flag with a bomb, and to slaughter and terrorize non-combatants; random destruction, with no military results, with no permanent result except to sicken and anger all

civilized mankind—this is war as practised on the city from Zeppelin airships. Every nation which still believes that something of humanity should be maintained in the usages of warfare should raise its voice against this arch-deed of pitiless savagery, against a repetition of such senseless and unforgivable blind massacre.

Those were fairly representative of American governing class opinion in the first stages of the war, though the American doctor (who was in the Army service of his own country) suffered an official rebuke for expressing his views. But this dislike of German methods of warfare was not a sufficient reason for going to war against her: was not taken as such by neutral European countries.

"Second thoughts" in the United States were of a different trend. The Alliance against the German Powers, desperately weak on land, was supreme at sea and sought to use to the full extent the power of blockade. Now it was contrary to the material interests of the United States for the Allies to try to prevent United States goods going not only to the German countries but also to neutral countries bordering on Germany (but obviously serving as corridors to Germany). Historically, the

United States has never accepted the British idea of the legitimate use of sea-power in war: since 1812 she has defended a conception of the "Freedom of the Seas" in war time which was at variance with our sea policy of effective blockade, though it was more nearly consistent with the principles of the "Declaration of London" which we had been inclined once to accept.

If the story of the blockade operations of the World War were disclosed in full, it would show that there was often a dangerous degree of friction between Great Britain and the United States on questions of American cotton and other products entering neutral countries, whence they would pass to German countries: and that it needed all the patient and skilful diplomacy of a master of statecraft (the then Lord Robert Cecil) to prevent friction developing to a rupture of friendly relations. The position was that if the United States had chosen at any time to declare that her conception of neutrality was to forbid supplies to any of the belligerents, the British-French Alliance could hardly have carried on: we should have been deprived of the chief advantage of our Sea Power, which allowed us to buy freely in the

United States but gave to our enemies only a precarious and limited market there.

The almost incredible stupidity of Germany assisted British diplomacy, even more than the balance of sentiment on our side among the American governing classes, in the difficult task of carrying out a blockade which was against the immediate material interests of the United States and which was contrary to the conception of international law held by the United States. Such incidents as the slaying of Nurse Cavell and Captain Fryatt—whatever case in excuse German lawyers can put forward—weighed heavily in the court of American public opinion and helped to a condonation of blockade acts on our part which might otherwise have been seriously challenged.

Throughout, German policy, if it had been deliberately designed to push the United States into a pro-British interpretation of blockade incidents, could not have acted more effectively. But apart from all effects of German stupidity, there was in the United States an obvious inclination to "strain a point" in favour of the Allies. British observation at the time could hardly note this, for in war one cannot take the detached view of being thankful for

small favours; but German observation did and exaggerated it vastly.

Of course we should have been much happier if the United States had intervened at an earlier stage; or if, without intervening, she had shown a greater degree of benevolence to us in her neutrality. But it is of importance now, in times of peace which allow cooler reflection, to keep clearly in mind that it was legitimate United States' policy to keep out of the war if possible, and only to engage in the war on clearest proof that her own national interests were involved—a policy not different in any great degree to British policy on some other occasions.

If any criticisms are directed against the late Mr. President Wilson on the ground that he used his power as head of the State to restrain a public opinion which was in favour of intervening on behalf of the Allies, they are completely answered by a reference to the records of the Presidential election in 1916, the "midchannel" period of the war, a time when the United States electors were in possession of all the facts. No party appealed to them on a policy of intervention. The Republican platform declared for neutrality; the Democratic

platform endorsed President Wilson's policy of keeping out of the war; the Prohibition and Socialist Party platforms were resolutely Pacifist. If there had been a party for intervention it would have been the Progressive Republican Party led by Colonel Roosevelt; but that Party did not even put a candidate forward, but endorsed the Republican candidate with his declaration for neutrality. Not a single United States vote was cast for entering into the war.

When, later, German desperation entered upon a policy of direct insult and injury towards the United States, the degree of patience shown by that country exasperated some British minds. That exasperation was natural enough in the circumstances and at the time. We were fighting for our very existence and could not look at things quite rationally. Sometimes, too, the policy of patience was worded a little unhappily, as, for example, in the phrase about "being too proud to fight." But now we should be able to look at things in a more equable spirit; perhaps even to recall that at the time of the Japanese-Russian War, when a Russian naval force in error attacked a British fishing fleet, there was something very like the "too

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proud to fight" spirit expressed in Great Britain to soothe public indignation.

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To interpret United States' policy during the World War as having been deliberately designed to ensure the greatest possible degree of exhaustion between the combatants before intervening is absurd (though such a policy would have had several precedents in world history). To interpret it as purely idealistic is foolish. It was, like most national policies in any country at any period, dictated chiefly by practical considerations of national advantage, with, however, an element of sentiment, the which element was more to be ascribed to German stupidity than to any memories of historical relation or kinship between the United States, Great Britain and France.

In the first stage of the World War, as we have seen, American public opinion was influenced by the trespass on the rights of a small nation, Belgium: for American public opinion is sensitive regarding the rights of small nations unless they happen to be on the American continent (where small nations must do as they are told to do by Washington). But

to have gone to war over Belgium—the United States was not a party to the Treaty guaranteeing that country's independence—would have been a Quixotism to which the Pacifist element, as well as the German element and the Irish element, would have been opposed. To undertake, and to carry out with splendid generosity and efficiency, the feeding of occupied Belgium's population was a sufficient gesture of sympathy, and it had the advantage of being a "neutral" gesture, most welcome to the Allies and not unwelcome to Germany, saved thus from one strain on her resources.

In the second stage of the World War the United States showed a real balance of sympathy towards the Allies, for then her own interests and her own dignity were to some extent being interfered with by them, and she refrained from what was well within her power, a method of peaceful protest which would have been deadly.

In the third stage the more serious attacks on United States interests and dignity came from Germany and finally compelled a Declaration of War. According to the views of some Americans that Declaration of War was delayed beyond the stage of reasonable patience, just as, according to the views of some British men, Sir Edward Grey's efforts to avoid war were carried beyond the stage of reasonable patience. But in time the United States did declare war against Germany.

One fact must be regarded as decisive in proof that the United States did not consciously and unscrupulously take advantage of the World War to advance her own material interests. The United States, as has been shown in a previous chapter, is by force of circumstances an Imperialist Power, with her special Imperial interests in the oceans near the American coasts. If she had been actuated by the same spirit and the same motives which led Germany to trample over every natural right and to abandon every scruple in the ambition to Germanize Europe, the United States would have fought on the German side. There were no German colonies to be acquired in American waters; but there were rich possible pickings of Allied colonies. Allowed that the intervention of the United States at any time between 1914 and 1918 on either side would have been determinative, it is clear that she was not guided to her decision by lust of territory or by what is best described as the

German definition of real-politik. There is indeed no more clearly comforting answer to those people in the United States who now talk of "coming to blows" with the British Empire than the recollection of the fact that, at a time when the United States could have intervened with the result, in all human probability, of humbling Great Britain, and could have found a pretext for doing so, she acted otherwise. Was there a European Power prior to 1914 which would not have seized any safe chance to humble Great Britain?

It is not the intention of this argument to suggest that the United States acted idealistically, or for any other reason than the good one that she considered the world safer for her own interests with Great Britain rather than with Germany as the most powerful of her neighbours east of the Atlantic; but to impress that she did not act with that short-sighted and unscrupulous greed for immediate advantage which brought the German Empire to ruin. "Imperialists" in world politics can be divided into two schools: those who are ready to compel to obedience troublesome neighbours who have not reached, or are not maintaining, a decent standard of civilization; and those

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who are ready, for the sake of extending their own Empire, to strike at peoples who are not "sitting in darkness." The United States during the World War was not of the second school.

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As a combatant, coming late into the field of the World War, the United States did not deserve the reproaches of some European critics, their minds tormented by the perils and harsh trials through which their peoples were passing. If it is to be assumed that a nation should act primarily in the cause of her own dignity and her own material interestsno other assumption is reasonable—those reproaches fall to the ground. At one period, the spring of 1918, the United States was faced with the alternative of making a concession of her national dignity or of risking the complete wreck of the Allied cause. She made the concession promptly and gracefully. The decision that American Army platoons and companies should be allowed to go into action as parts of British and French brigades was a complete disproof of any policy of narrow selfishness. The help given by this reinforcement of keen, fresh troops was most valuable.

At the time, the American Army could not put trained Divisions in the field, but could put rank-and-file and junior regimental officers. A narrowly selfish policy would have said: "American soldiers cannot fight under foreign officers: when the American Army is ready as an Army it will go into the field; or perhaps when American Divisions are ready they can serve with foreign Corps or Armies, since the Division is a fully organized unit. But further than that we cannot go." A more generous, and a wiser, policy led General Pershing to offer, during a serious crisis, the immediate help his man-power could give.

To my mind it was one of the finest gestures of the war and afforded reason to believe that the American character will ultimately prove fit to carry out its weighty responsibilities in world affairs in a spirit of wisdom and farsightedness, once it is freed from the illusions referred to in a previous chapter.

In the field the American officer and soldier were good comrades pace the occasional outcropping of an individual boastfulness; and the spirit which inspired some declarations: "We have come to show you how to win this war," or, "It is we who won the war," was by

no means peculiar to the United States Army. It was not impossible to discover Canadians and Australians who thought that the British Army would have had a slender chance but for them; or British combatants who had the poorest opinion of the French; or French combatants who would confide to any sympathetic ear that the British infantry was more concerned about afternoon tea than fighting and the British artillery was "an affair of the waggon-line, excellent for a Horse Show behind the lines but otherwise of little use." It is a way Allies have of talking of one another.

I was an officer at G.H.Q., British Armies in France in 1918, with some duties which brought me into contact with the American troops and gave me good opportunities of studying them. It is a fact that in many cases they arrived with a marked prejudice against the British; but this rarely lasted long, and as soon as they settled down they were the most reasonable and the most cordial of comrades. If the exuberance of some—not all—Americans led to vaunting "We won the war," the error was more of taste than of fact.

Taking all circumstances into account and reckoning not war services only but war effect,

the actual final blow to the Germans' hopes was delivered when the United States of America declared war. It was when Germany made that declaration necessary, in spite of the wish of the United States to keep out of the war. that all hope vanished of German victory. From that moment it was clear that ultimately she would have to submit to whatever conditions were imposed on her at the conclusion of the war. When we seek to belittle the effect of American participation, we are unconsciously repeating war-time German propaganda—the silly nonsense which German writers gave out to comfort their people. At first they promulgated the idea which was embodied in the German phrase "those idiotic Yankees"—the idea that the United States was a kind of Wild West Show, whose simpleton rulers could be fooled without trouble by the super-intelligent Germans. When that idea was exploded, the next to take its place was equally foolish—that anyhow the antagonism of the United States did not matter, for she would not make war, and if she made war the effort would be so feeble as not to be worth considering.

Then, when the grim shadow of the great American preparation was growing, the German

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people were asked to take comfort from yet another delusion—that the Americans would prove to be "quitters," would be frightened off the field by the German offensive of the spring of 1918. The *Hamburger Echo* voiced that delusion when it announced:

It is curious that at this critical moment American war experts are reported to be planning an inspection trip to the front. It looks as though American capitalists were growing nervous. The dollar-republic has stolen ships which ensure her a great Fleet, but American capital is not unlimited, hence the liquidation of the war may be contemplated.

How different the truth about that "inspection trip," which had the effect, certainly, of impressing the American Staff with the extreme seriousness of the campaign, but led to the result not of "quitting" but of brigading the American troops temporarily with those of the Allies. It was an instance of a sensible sacrifice of national vanity which has few parallels in history—that decision of the Americans to allow their soldiers to fight under British and French flags.

Minor sacrifices of national vanity were made with equal cheerfulness—and how much more difficult these minor sacrifices sometimes prove

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to be! The American troops which came within the British area had to be persuaded into some conformity with our methods; in particular they had to be coaxed away from their mountainous ideas of kit. To see an American regiment disembark, one would conclude that every soldier had a roll-top desk and a typewriter in his pack. Very quickly, and with great good humour, they came into line with our arrangements. One of the chief difficulties was in regard to underclothing. The British Army had evolved a very practical system of keeping the troops in clean underclothing without adding to the weight of their kits. A soldier went up to the trenches, or to his unit, wearing a clean suit of underclothes. On the first opportunity, usually within a week, the soldier went back (on relief if he were an infantry man, on roster if he were a special unit man) to the baths which were set up in every Divisional area. Here he stripped for a hot bath, and whilst he was in the bath his uniform was cleaned, deprived of any insect population, and pressed, and his underclothing was taken away to the laundry. He never saw that underclothing again but drew a new suit, or a clean suit, as he went out of the baths; and so he marched off spruce and smart. The suit of underclothing he had left behind was thoroughly disinfected, washed, repaired if necessary, and went then into the general stock to be issued again.

At first the Americans could not see that such a system would work. Their idea was for every man to carry three suits of underclothing, one on his body, two in his kit. Presumably he was expected to change in the midst of the ghastly mud of a Flanders trench. Also presumably he was expected to carry about his dirty suits with him, which showed a curious degree of trust in human nature. It was objected to the British system that "all men were not the same size," and in response it was pointed out that neither were all the suits of underclothing kept in stock at Divisional Baths. but that with a fair attention to the law of averages and a reasonable surplus allowance, no thin man had to go away with a fat man's suit and no tall man with a short man's. The British system was finally adopted and won full American approval.

It would be impossible to praise too highly the common sense and civility of the American liaison officers who had to argue out these points with British officers. They were never unreasonable, and were prompt in crediting our officers with politeness and goodwill. I think that in every case where an American and a British Division were thrown together they parted company with a marked increase of mutual good will and respect. One American officer summed up to me:

"I don't say you British people are overpolite. But you are reliable. Go into a powwow and a British officer may strike you as a bit surly. But if he says he'll do a thing you can reckon that thing done and no need to worry. Some other people are very polite, and they say awfully nicely that they'll do anything and everything you ask; and six months after you find nothing has been done."

Some critics are inclined to hold that General Pershing was in too much of a hurry to put an end to the system which allowed his troops to be brigaded with the British and French forces and to set up his own national organization. They are blind to the facts that in permitting that arrangement at all the American nation was showing a high degree of imagination and generosity: that it helped to save the situation in the early months of 1918; that, once the

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immediate crisis was over, to have continued it would have been to consent to an unnecessary derogation of national dignity.

Any just estimate of the events of 1914–18 must grant to the United States the credit of a policy which combined with a wise regard for national interests a degree of generosity; and it will be of great advantage to good Anglo-American understanding, which is essential to the peace of the world, that that just estimate should be accepted in the British Empire.

The post-war policy of the United States is another matter, and will be considered next.